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FOREWORD
In the post-September 11, 2001 (9/11) security environment, the United States faces a complex combination of
threats. These range from state to nonstate actors, many of
regional or even global reach. In this environment, weak
and fragile states have become a predominant security challenge for the United States, by providing breeding grounds
for terrorism, weapons proliferation, and trafficking in humans and narcotics.
Addressing the challenges posed by these weak and
failed states will require increasingly demanding military
interventions, often over a great distance and prolonged
periods of time. As a result of several engagements over
the last decade—starting with the Balkans and today with
Iraq and Afghanistan—the U.S. military has gained valuable experience in undertaking stability operations. But as
the global demand for such operations grows, the United
States should not be expected to carry that burden alone;
we must look to our partners and allies to share some of the
global responsibility. In this, Europe is unquestionably the
most capable and natural U.S. ally.
Despite substantial cuts in the aftermath of the Cold
War, European militaries continue to constitute a global
force matched only by that of the United States. Since the
Kosovo War, Europeans have been slowly building their
own security institutions within the European Union (EU).
Since then, the EU’s role has increased in the field of security and defense, most recently through the adoption of the
Treaty of Lisbon. While most U.S. policymakers are familiar with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),
developments in the field of security and defense within
the EU have thus far received little attention in the United
States, despite the EU’s increasing importance.
In this monograph, Mr. Bjoern Seibert provides timely
and interesting insights into the EU’s new security structure. He examines the largest and most complex EU mili-
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tary operation in Africa, Operation EUFOR TCHAD/RCA,
and provides an unprecedented look inside the workings
of an EU military operation. Mr. Seibert highlights both
successes and failures and then scrutinizes the impact of
the operation on the ground. He then addresses an extensive list of lessons that can be drawn from this complex
multinational stability operation in Africa. He correctly
observes that the operation underscores the EU’s long remaining road toward realizing its ambitious agenda. This
will not merely require a more expeditionary mindset, but
also substantial shifts in budget priorities and reinvestment. Though the process may take years to complete, it
is undoubtedly the right course for Europe to take, and
would be in the best interest of the United States.
Mr. Seibert concludes that the United States must remain involved and supportive of the EU’s efforts to build a
stronger Common Security and Defense Policy. The United
States has much to gain from having a strong and effective ally in Europe, and should provide advice and perhaps
even material support if the EU is to realize its ambitious
agenda.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this
monograph as a topic of debate concerning European security and defense issues.

		

		
		
		

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
Based on the assessments made herein, this monograph recommends embracing the European Union’s
(EU) Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).
This recommendation is based on the following key
findings:
• The new security environment increasingly
requires cooperation between allies to address
emerging security threats;
• A militarily stronger Europe that carries a greater share of global responsibility is an important
asset for U.S. foreign policy;
• The EU’s CSDP has the potential to deliver the
political will needed for a militarily more proactive Europe;
• The EU’s CSDP may thus be critical to overcoming the recognized stagnation in capability improvements and mobilizing serious European
capabilities development.
To be successful, practical steps that entail shifts
in U.S. thinking as well as organization are required.
First, establish the necessary capacities to strengthen
the U.S. understanding of the EU’s CSDP in order to
overcome existing blind spots and gain a deeper understanding of the CSDP. This may require organizational changes in U.S. embassies in Europe, as well as
U.S. Missions to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the EU, in order to better identify,
track, and decide whether and how to seek to influence the CSDP.
Second, encourage European members to focus on
increasing their defense budgets. Moreover, empha-
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size the need for more efficient defense spending in
Europe through cooperation and pooling of assets.
Concretely, this could be undertaken by improving
the relationship between NATO and the European
Defense Agency (EDA).
Third, emphasize European responsibility for crises occurring on Europe’s periphery. This would encourage a sense of ownership of crisis response and
help Europeans undertake the critical steps needed to
address existing capability shortfalls.
Fourth, seek to improve the relationship between
NATO and the EU. At the same time accept that Europe needs to have the necessary structures to act autonomously, including a limited permanent planning
capacity outside NATO.
Fifth, support the development of a common U.S.EU framework for stability operations, including doctrine and training. This would allow for increased, but
less ad hoc, coordination between the United States
and the EU in the field, and encourage a sharing of
lessons learned.
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OPERATION EUFOR TCHAD/RCA
AND THE EUROPEAN UNION’S
COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY
INTRODUCTION
The key feature of the post-September 11, 2001
(9/11) security environment is that challenges from
weak rather than strong states will constitute the major security threat to U.S. interests.1 Weak, failing, or
failed states, unable to control parts of their territory,
provide security, or deliver major services to large
segments of their population are the biggest security
threat. They are vulnerable to a variety of actors and
armed groups—terrorists, criminals, insurgents, and
militias—that operate within their territories.2 These
events are, unfortunately, no longer the exception;
they promise to be a persistent part of the new security environment for years to come.
It is in this environment that stability operations
have become of critical importance. This landmark
shift was translated at the national level with the
2005 Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 3000.05,
which instructed the U.S. military to treat stability and
reconstruction operations with equal priority to combat operations. Despite its unrivaled military power
and potential, it has already become clear that the U.S.
military—and specifically the U.S. Army—cannot carry this burden alone. Increasingly, the United States
must rely on its allies and partners to respond to the
growing global security demands. In this, Europe is
unquestionably the most capable U.S. ally.3 European
countries constitute a global force matched only by
the United States. Collectively, European states have
sustained 50,000-100,000 troops in operations outside
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of home countries for most of the past 2 decades—often in close cooperation with the United States.4 As a
whole, Europe still accounts for about 21 percent of
the world’s military spending—jointly outspending
the combined defense budgets of China, India, Russia, and Brazil by a factor of two.5 Europe is hence the
natural U.S. partner in sharing the burden of stability
operations.
In the wake of the European failure during the Yugoslav war, Europe has slowly been building its security institutions under the European Union (EU). Since
then, the EU has conducted 23 civilian and military
missions abroad within the framework of its Common
Security and Defense Policy (CSDP),6 and shown an
increasing readiness and willingness to engage in stability operations in its wider neighborhood.7
Given its importance as the most capable U.S. partner, Europe’s common defense aspirations and their
future evolution will heavily influence U.S. strategic
options. Studying those aspirations and how they
translate in reality, as well as the EU’s evolving security institutions, is critical for U.S. policymakers and
the broader U.S. military establishment. As it moves
forward in an era of more limited resources, the United States has much to gain from understanding what
its European partners are capable of, and hence how
much of the burden they can—and should—be expected to carry.
Today, however, both U.S. policymakers and security experts pay little attention to the EU. A recent
study underlined the shocking dearth of capabilities
the United States invests in analyzing security and
defense related developments within the EU.8 Against
the background of the importance of allies in the new
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security environment, coupled with scarce resources,
this approach comes at an increasingly higher cost.
Approach.
The state of the EU’s defense aspirations can be assessed in different ways. One way is to provide a comprehensive overview of the EU’s complex and ever
changing institutional architecture;9 yet another is to
focus on European military capabilities.10 This monograph takes a different, more dynamic, approach. Since
an important self-stated goal of the CSDP is to enable
Europe to undertake military operations autonomously—that is, without U.S. support—this monograph attempts to assess the EU and its members’ progress by
focusing precisely on this goal. Military operations in
fact offer a dynamic view of how the politics, institutions, and capabilities interact in reality, and thus
present an accurate and encompassing image of the
EU’s military progress. Studying the EU’s military operations, I believe, allows for a better understanding of
the EU’s potential and limitations, what is being done
to address the limitations, and the way forward.11
Rather than providing a brief overview of the multiple EU-led military operations undertaken to date,
however, this monograph provides an in-depth case
study of the EU’s largest, longest, and most challenging military operation in Africa—Operation EUROPEAN UNION FORCE CHAD/CENTRAL AFRICAN
REPUBLIC (EUFOR TCHAD/RCA)—as a window
into European defense policy and capability.12
Though EUFOR TCHAD/RCA was, in absolute
terms, a small operation, it can nonetheless provide
insights into the state of affairs of the CSDP. On the
one hand, stability operations are demanding and
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complex. This is especially true in current multinational stability operations, where military forces are
increasingly tasked to cooperate at a much lower
level.13 Conducting them successfully thus requires a
greater level of cooperation and coordination between
multiple actors, often facilitated by a range of institutional arrangements. Given that the EU is a relatively
new security actor, its ability to master such challenges
allows for drawing conclusions about its current state
of affairs.
On the other hand, Operation EUFOR TCHAD/
RCA is specifically destined to provide broader insights into the CSDP, as it set new benchmarks for EUled military operations in a number of ways:
• First, the operation was the most complex operation the EU has yet undertaken. Unlike previous operations that either reinforced or replaced existing operations, EUFOR TCHAD/
RCA was the entry force. The EU thus had to
build an operation from scratch, far from Europe, in an area characterized by isolation and
the absence of basic infrastructure.
• Second, though relatively small, the operation
was still far less limited in terms of size, duration, and geographic reach than previous EU
military operations. For 16 months, EUFOR operated in an area half the size of France.
• Third, despite strong French participation, the
Operation was the most multinational military
operation the EU has undertaken in Africa.14
The combination of these factors makes Operation
EUFOR TCHAD/RCA a good test case for the EU
CSDP.
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Structure.
The first section of this monograph will consist of
a comprehensive overview and assessment of Operation EUFOR TCHAD/RCA. It will provide insights
into the different phases of the operation—preparation, deployment, execution, and redeployment.
The second section will outline the lessons of Operations EUFOR TCHAD/RCA and the way forward.
It thereby places the operation in the larger context of
the rising CSDP. This part is also meant to give policymakers an understanding about the possible trajectory of CSDP.
The third and last section of the monograph will
address what the findings of the previous two parts
mean for the United States and provide recommendations for U.S. policymakers, and particularly the DoD
leadership, in its dealings with the CSDP.
Limitations.
It is important to point out that the following is not
without limitations. Information on EU operations is
notoriously scarce—which explains the dearth of indepth studies on previous EU operations.15 There is
also a tendency in the existing literature to focus on
the planning process of an operation, rather than the
field perspective.16 However, as the implementation
perspective is of key importance, the author of this
monograph has conducted a large number of interviews over a period of 15 months with numerous European officials and military officers involved in the
operation.17 Aside from numerous European officials,
officials from Chad, Central African Republic (CAR),
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and the United States, as well as the United Nations
(UN), were also interviewed for the monograph. Given the sensitivity of the information provided, most
interviews were only possible on a “not-for-attribution” basis, which is a clear limitation of the monograph. Moreover, despite the lengthy research on the
topic, given that the study will seek to provide an
overview over a period of about 2 years, it will remain
incomplete and its conclusions will be tentative. Having underlined these limitations, the author hopes to
provide an in-depth case study of Operation EUFOR
TCHAD/RCA, which offers valuable insights into the
EU’s CSDP.
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CHAPTER 1
CASE STUDY OPERATION EUFOR TCHAD/RCA
BACKGROUND: THE ROAD TO EUFOR
The Crisis in Eastern Chad/CAR.
The origins of Operation EUFOR TCHAD/RCA
go back to mid-2006.18 Growing insecurity in eastern
Chad, which borders the western Sudanese Darfur
region, increasingly appeared on the international
community’s radar. As a result, in June 2006, the UN
Security Council dispatched a fact-finding mission,
which recommended a security presence to protect
refugees and displaced persons in the UN camps in
eastern Chad bordering Sudan.19
An International Force for Chad and CAR?
Given the fear of regionalization of the crisis in
Darfur, France, supported by other members of the
Security Council, increasingly advocated in favor of
an international security presence in eastern Chad.20
These efforts bore fruit in late August 2006 when UN
Security Council Resolution 1706 broadened the mandate of the UN Mission in the Sudan (UNAMIS) to include a security presence in eastern Chad and CAR.21
The resolution was intended to place operations in
Darfur and Chad/CAR under a single umbrella. On
the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 1706, a
Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO) assessment mission was dispatched to Chad/CAR, in
late November 2006.
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The DPKO assessment mission proposed two principal options: a monitoring or a monitoring/protection
mission.22 It was assessed that the monitoring mission
would require a brigade-size operation (6,000 troops),
and the monitoring/protection mission would require
a division-size operation (10,900 troops), in addition
to a smaller police presence (580 Chadian police/160
UN police).23 Overall, however, skepticism prevailed.
First, it was understood that a military operation
would pose enormous challenges.24 Second, it was
feared that a force would be operating in the midst of
continuing hostilities—i.e., there would be no peace
to keep—and lack a clear exit strategy. UN SecretaryGeneral Annan concluded that “the conditions for an
effective UN peacekeeping operation do not, therefore, seem to be in place as of the time of writing of the
present report.” If, notwithstanding, the UN Security
Council nonetheless considered pursuing the idea,
the Secretary-General recommended a monitoring/
protection mission.25
The Chadian President Idriss Déby was also skeptical. Given his support for Sudanese rebel groups in
the border region, he rejected the idea of establishing
a border-monitoring mission. Another red line for
him was any international presence inside the camps,
which served as important recruitment bases for
the Chadian armed forces as well as Sudanese rebel
groups.26 It thus became increasingly clear that President Déby would reject an international force presence.
The new UN Secretary-General, Ban-Ki Moon, dispatched another UN assessment mission to Chad and
CAR in February 2007. While the findings and proposed concept for an operation essentially validated
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the previous findings (including the two previous
proposed options and recommendation for the larger
force), the overall tone of the new UN Secretary-General was notably more positive towards such a force.
The UN Secretary-General report, however, also contained proposals to include a political dimension to
the mission, which was another contentious matter for
President Déby. The situation thus remained blocked
and a UN deployment seemed increasingly unlikely.
The situation would only change with the outcome of
the French Presidential elections in May 2007.
An EU Military Operation in Chad and CAR.
The new French government under President Nicolas Sarkozy was keen on doing something about Darfur.27 President Sarkozy’s interest was strongly shared
by new French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner.28
Despite these desires, there was soon a realization in
Paris that, as things stood, very little could be done
about Darfur. Internationally, there was already broad
support for the deployment of the African Union/
UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) and thus
little political space for new initiatives.29 The focus
of the new French government then moved to Chad.
This shift was also supported by the fact that France
had more interests in Chad than in Darfur, and a far
greater ability to influence the Chadian leadership.30
Thus, France proposed to deploy an EU—rather
than UN—force, which would serve as a bridging operation until a UN force followed. For France, this proposal had at least two benefits. First, Chad was much
more likely to accept a European force—with a strong
French presence—than an UN force. France has a military-technical cooperation agreement with Chad, and
French forces, as part of Operation EPERVIER (Opera9

tion SPARROWHAWK), have been stationed in Chad
for several decades.31 President Déby felt comfortable
with the French.32 Second, the proposal also fit well
into the larger French policy agenda of promoting
the CSDP—especially as such an operation would
highlight the military, as opposed to the purely civilian character of the CSDP.33 The UN, however, was
divided on the issue; skepticism prevailed in the UN
DPKO.34
Officially approached by France in late May, most
European countries were suspicious of French motives.35 Critically, most European countries feared
being instrumentalized for a French agenda. France
in fact maintained a close relationship with Chadian
President Déby. There was hence widespread suspicion in European capitals that France’s true motive for
pushing for a European force was to shield Chadian
President Déby from rebel groups, rather than to protect civilians.36 Moreover, as in previous operations,
the EU member states also worried about French efforts to Europeanize the costs for its military engagement in Africa.37 These suspicions were compounded
by general disagreement on the nature of the CSDP;
indeed, not all EU member states agreed with France’s
focus on militarizing it. To overcome this skepticism,
France spent a great deal of political capital to convince its European partners.38
France’s immense political effort to launch the operation bore fruit in August 2007. France managed to
secure political support for the operation in Europe,
notwithstanding remaining skepticism, especially in
Germany. France also secured President Déby’s support by promising him that any political mandate for
the force would be excluded, and that Chad would retain control of the border and the refugee/internally
displaced person (IDP) camps. While the UN DPKO
10

continued to be skeptical, France drafted a resolution
in late August 2007, which was to authorize a European “bridging force” in eastern Chad and northeastern
CAR. In August, the EU Military Staff (EUMS) undertook an information-gathering mission to Chad.39
PHASE 1: DECISIONMAKING AND PLANNING40
Despite persistent skepticism from most EU member states, France managed to find sufficient political
support to launch the EU’s crisis management decisionmaking and planning process.41 Figure 1 gives a
brief overview of the three formal phases that lead to
the launch of an operation: development of a Crisis
Management Concept (CMC), development of (military) strategic options, and finally operation planning.

See Appendix 1 for acronym definitions.

Figure 1. European Union’s Planning Process.42
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It is beyond the scope of this monograph to reiterate the EU planning doctrine in detail43—especially as
the EU has not always followed these procedures in
the past.44 Rather, this section will give a very brief
overview of the decisionmaking and planning process
in Operation EUFOR TCHAD/RCA.45
Planning on the EU-level began with the EU’s
top-level political committee—the Political and Security Committee (PSC)46 - tasking the General Council
Secretariat to lay out the conceptual framework for a
possible EU crisis response, the CMC. However, differences between the member states on the response
led to lengthy debates, so that the member states only
approved the CMC by mid-September 2007.47 The
agreed conceptual framework laid out the EU’s comprehensive response to the crisis in eastern Chad/
northeastern CAR, which included humanitarian and
development assistance, in addition to a military dimension.48
Building on this conceptual framework, the EUMS
was officially tasked to develop military strategic options (MSO).49 Despite its limited resources, the EUMS
drew up four different military options, on the basis of
a fact-finding mission, varying in size between a land
maneuver force of one to four battalions.50 These options were put forth to the highest military body, the
EU Military Committee (EUMC), and the PSC.51 Disagreement over the options ensued in both the EUMC
and the PSC.52 Eventually, in early October 2007, the
decision was made to adopt the military option that
proposed to protect the population and support UN
operations. This option called for a land maneuver
force of four battalions, to be deployed simultaneously.53
A month earlier, prior to the agreement on the
military option, the PSC had given the planning
12

authority to the French Military Headquarters in Mont
Valérien (near Paris) to become the operational headquarters (HQ).54 The alternative to using one of the
national HQs—the activation of the EU Operations
Center (EU OpsCenter)55—was considered but eventually dropped for practical concerns.56 The process of
activation and internationalization of the French Operation Headquarters (OHQ) began in early September, overseen by a French colonel.57
In mid-October 2007, the EU member states legally
established the operation, and officially appointed
Lieutenant General Patrick Nash from Ireland as Operation Commander and French Brigadier General
Jean-Philippe Ganascia as Force Commander. The
Operation Commander arrived in Mont Valérien after his appointment, which had been activated for
almost 1 1/2 months prior to his arrival.58 Based on
the given Initiating Military Directive, the Operation
Commander and his staff were put under pressure to
process the key planning documents, the Concept of
Operations (CONOPS) including the Statement of Requirements (SOR) and the Operation Plan (OPLAN).
Military Planning Process.
The CONOPS for Operation EUFOR TCHAD/
RCA laid out the broad conception of the operation.
It situated the operation in the context of the larger
political objectives of the EU. The focus was on preventing the Darfur crisis from either worsening or
spilling into neighboring regions. It thus situated the
operation in the larger context of EU support for the
UNAMID. More specifically, the CONOPS laid out
the following missions for the operation:
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a. Protect civilians in danger
b. Facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and
the free movement of humanitarian personnel through
improved security
c. Protect UN and associated personnel
d. Encourage the voluntary return of IDPs, especially in the Dar Sila region.
The CONOPS stated that the desired military
end-state of the international community was the establishment of a self-sustaining Safe and Secure Environment (SASE) in eastern Chad and northeastern
CAR. The military end-date for the Operation EUFOR
TCHAD/RCA however was set at 1 year after the
achievement of Initial Operational Capability (IOC).
The EU’s exit strategy was to be a UN follow-on force.
It also confirmed the need for posture and operations
to be impartial and independent, as failure to do so
would put the mission’s accomplishment at risk.59 At
the same time, freedom of movement throughout the
entire Area of Operation (AOO), including the border
area, had to be established. The only exception to this
would be the refugee and IDP camps and their vicinity, where the EUFOR could not operate or intervene
except in extreme cases. While the CONOPS put the
focus on Chad, it underscored that deterring armed
groups within the entire AOO, and especially those
transiting from Sudan to Chad via CAR, was one of
the military objectives.
The Operation Commander requested a total of
4,199 troops.60 The land component of the requested
force was to be made up of a maneuver force of three
battalions (total strength, 1,575 troops) supported by
Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support
(CSS) of 440 troops. In addition, the SOR requested
a Combined Joint Special Operations Task Forces
14

(CJSOTF) (strength, 200 troops) and a battalion-sized
strategic reserve (strength, 600 troops).61
The OPLAN outlines the proposed conduct of the
operation based on the CONOPS. In the case of Operation EUFOR TCHAD/RCA, the OPLAN laid out
the following key military tasks on the basis of the
member states’ approved Initiating Military Directive
(IMD):
1. Contribute to the provision of security to the
Mission des Nations Unies en République Centre Africaine
et au Tchad (Mission of the United Nations in the Republic of Central Africa and to Chad [MINURCAT]).
2. Contribute to the provision of security in the
AOO to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian support.
3. Support the creation of the conditions required
for the voluntary return of internally displaced peoples, especially in the Dar Sila region.
4. Support the creation of the conditions for launching a longer-term civilian reconstruction and development effort necessary for the return of these persons.
5. Contribute to the protection of civilians in danger, particularly refugees and displaced persons.
6. In CAR, deter the movement of armed groups,
specifically those transiting from Sudan to Chad via
CAR.
7. Conduct military information activities to support the EU information strategy.
To achieve these key military tasks, the OPLAN affirmed that the center of military gravity (CoG) was
the credibility of the EU military force. It also warned
that loss of credibility could put the mission’s accomplishment at risk; and thus emphasized the need to
establish a credible presence in order for deterrence
to work.
15

The OPLAN confirmed that the operation would
have an end-date, rather than an end-state. The enddate for the operation was set at 12 months from
IOC. According to the OPLAN’s timetable, IOC was
to be reached 4-6 weeks after the decision was made
to launch the operation. Full Operational Capability
(FOC) was to be reached in mid-May 2008—just before the beginning of the rainy season in Chad, which
renders roads and communications exceedingly difficult. The AOO encompassed eastern Chad and northeastern Central African Republic.
Force Generation.62
After the Political and Security Committee adopted the CONOPS and SOR, the official force-generation process began.63 Although political consent for
the CONOPS is necessary, it is in the force-generation
process that member states demonstrate their true
political will. The ensuing force-generation process
proved that politically supporting the CONOPS and
OPLAN and actually resourcing the operation are two
very different things.64
The first force-generation conference took place
in early November 2007. As few countries were willing to contribute to the operation, considerable gaps
remained, and four additional force-balancing conferences were necessary.65 The second and third forcebalancing conferences in mid-November 2007 did not
generate new announcements of capability. This created tensions among the European partners and concerns that the process might break down.66 The reluctance of Germany and the United Kingdom (UK) to
contribute any troops and/or equipment made filling
existing gaps especially difficult.67 Increasingly frustrated by other EU member states, France turned to
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non-EU countries such as Ukraine and Russia to contribute personnel and equipment for the operation.68
Gaps in critical capacities—such as tactical airlift assets (fixed- and rotary-wing) and deployable medical
facilities—remained, however. As it became increasingly clear that the SOR would not be fulfilled, the Operation Commander was asked to revise his request
downwards and to submit a list of assets that would
be absolutely critical for the mission’s launch. To
avoid further embarrassment and failure, President
Sarkozy reluctantly agreed in late December 2007 to
provide much of the lacking troop and rotary-wing
assets and agreed for France to assume the role of logistical lead nation.69 These concessions increased the
French participation to over 55 percent—well beyond
the original goal of providing no more than 40 percent
of troops, which was meant to avoid the appearance
of a French operation.70
With the additional French contributions, and
against a background of increasing political pressure,
the Operation Commander recommended launching
the operation in late January 2008, despite continuing gaps in the SOR. The shortfalls notably included
tactical and rotary wing assets—and with no strategic reserve preidentified. While the force generation
process would officially continue after the launch of
the operation, senior EU military officials had few illusions that substantial further contributions would be
forthcoming. Indeed, some countries could not even
sustain their original contributions.71

17

PHASE 2: PREPARATION: ACHIEVING INITIAL
OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY
The preparation phase lasted from late January
2008 to mid-March 2008. This phase had two key objectives: First, establish an initial visible presence in
the AOO through a multinational Initial Entry Force
(IEF), and second, start preparation for the arrival of
the main force. A special emphasis was put on the
establishment of EUFOR as a credible and impartial
force.72
The first test came just hours after the official decision to launch the operation. In a swift response to
the EU’s decision, a coalition of Chadian rebel groups
supported by Sudan launched a major offensive to
seize power in the Chadian capital, N’Djamena.73 After crossing unopposed nearly 700 kilometers (km)
of semi-desert, government forces unsuccessfully attempted to stop the rebel advance near the capital.74
The rebels entered N’Djamena on February 3, 2008.
While the situation did not test EUFOR—only very
few troops were already in theater—all eyes were
on France’s reaction. In the last major rebel offensive
in 2006, France intervened on behalf of the Chadian
government under its defense agreement with Chad.75
This time, aware of the reservations of its European
partners, France showed more restraint.76 The rebels encircled the presidential palace where President
Déby and his most loyal forces were entrenched. After
hard fighting, President Déby’s troops—mainly the
State Security Service (DGSSIE) units—succeeded,
with external support, in pushing the rebels out of the
city.77 Despite the failure of the rebels to overthrow
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President Déby, the attempt underlined the fragility
of the Chadian government. Against this background,
the EU temporarily suspended the deployment process, to reassess the evolving situation.
A Logistical Mt. Everest.78
Despite doubts, deployment resumed in midFebruary 2008, with newfound urgency. Timely deployment, in fact, became even more important as the
rainy season (mid-May-October) was approaching.79
The logistical challenges were, however, formidable.
As an autonomous EU operation carried out in a challenging environment, EUFOR TCHAD/RCA tested
the limits of the EU’s logistical capabilities. The key
logistical challenge in the operation was the deployment of the force into theater, given its remote location, the poor transport infrastructure and the lack of
host-nation support.80 As in previous EU military operations, the responsibility for deployment of personnel and equipment to theater rests with the individual
Troop Contributing Nations (TCN).81 Thus, each TCN
needs to develop a logistics plan for deployment. This
created its own set of problems as, aside from France,
this was, in fact, the first broader military experience
in Africa for most of the participating European countries.
For strategic deployment of a force, both strategic airlift and strategic sealift were used.82 Given the
high costs of strategic airlift, most countries relied
heavily on strategic sealift/road transport, especially
for their main forces. The air-route entailed strategic
airlift from Europe to N’Djamena, followed by a combination of tactical airlift and road movement to the
AOO (another 800 km).83 The air route was especially
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used for the Initial Entry Force (IEF) in order to have
advanced units early in the AOO. Given European
shortfalls in strategic airlift, most troop-contributing
countries made heavy use of Russian/Ukrainian aircraft—Il-76 Candid and An-124 Condor—operated by
private contractors. A total of 176 sorties of Il-76/An124 were utilized in deployment alone.84 In addition,
some countries also used tactical aircraft, mostly C130s.
The strategic sealift entailed sealift to Douala Seaport and from there through Cameroon and Chad to
the AOO. A second line of communication from the
Bengazi Seaport (Libya) through the Sahara desert
was considered but not used during the deployment
phase.85 The sealift option was, however, very time
consuming. From Europe to Douala Port (Cameroon)
the sealift would take about 15 days. From Douala
Port, another 2000 km of rail and road movement was
needed to get to Abéché in eastern Chad. The overland
transport, which was largely outsourced to private
companies, alone took about 25 days.86 Furthermore,
political turmoil in Cameroon caused further delays
in the deployment.87 For the deployment alone, about
3,500 troops, their equipment and weapons, ammunition, housing, and life support materials, together
with 1,500 containers and 900 vehicles had to be transported to a very isolated and remote area in Africa.88
This required a total of nine sealift transportations by
cargo ship from Europe to Douala, and subsequently 21 large rail convoys and 140 road convoys from
Douala through Cameroon.89
Deployment was further complicated by the lack
of basic infrastructure in the AOO and the need for
substantial infrastructure build-up. Through the EU’s
common financing system, N’Djamena and Abéché
airports had to be upgraded in order to increase their
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capabilities and facilitate deployment.90 The costs of
these infrastructure updates amounted to a total of
about 70 million Euros. Their timely completion was
only possible as preparations began prior to the official launch of the operation.91 At the same time,
the construction of operational camps began. Given the absence of host-nation support, a total of six
camps had to be built. These included a rear camp in
N’Djamena (Europa Camp), the main camp in Abéché
(Stars Camp) with a capacity for 2,000 personnel and
three main Forward Operating Bases (FOB) in Iribia
(north), Forchana (center) and Goz Beida (south) with
a capacity for 600 personnel each.92 While the camps
were being built, the Force Headquarters was located
in the French military base in N’Djamena, and IEFs
were mainly located at the French Camp Croci in Abéché.93
Operations Begin: Establishing Visibility and
Credibility.
Parallel to the preparation of the deployment of
the main force, the IEF began its operation. As in previous EU military operations in Africa, Special Operations Forces (SOF) acted as the IEF. They were able to
deploy quickly with a light logistical footprint, and
remain relatively self-sustainable under harsh conditions.94 The CJSOTF was composed of six Special
Forces Task Groups (two French, one Swedish, one
Belgian, one Irish, and one Austrian) and one Special
Forces Air Task Group (with fixed and rotary-wing
assets), in total 450 troops.95 Different from EUFOR’s
conventional forces, CJSOTF was directly under the
command of the Operational Headquarters.
A first incident happened in early March 2008
when a single vehicle of the Initial Entry Forces near
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Tissi in the three-border region of Chad, Sudan and
CAR, crossed accidentally into Sudan during a reconnaissance mission.96 The vehicle was subsequently engaged by Sudanese Armed Forces.97 In the exchange
of fire, one of the two French soldiers in the vehicle
was killed.98 The second soldier was recovered by a
rescue mission. The incident and subsequent rescue
operations underlined the IEF’s willingness to resort
to force when needed. After the incident, CJSOTF remained very active until mid-April when their presence was significantly reduced.99
While engaged in Special Forces operations, the CJSOTF importantly contributed to EUFOR’s situational
awareness by conducting special Surveillance and Reconnaissance (SR) operations. At the same time, the
presence of SOF was also meant as a symbolic show
of intentions and will to go beyond the rhetoric. It signaled the robustness of EUFOR, despite the very light
footprint of the initial force, and that the force was not
a “paper tiger,” but a real force to be reckoned with.
This may have helped preempt any major tests to the
force’s resolve. Moreover, CJSOTF also underlined
that the EU was capable of conducting a rapid deployment of multinational units and of having “boots on
the ground” anywhere in Africa.
The Declaration of Initial Operational Capability.
Despite various delays in deployment, Initial Operational Capability (IOC) was declared in mid-March
2008. This date was significant as the end-date of the
operation was defined by the mandate as being 12
months after IOC.100 The decision to declare IOC was
not uncontroversial, as the operation remained very
fragile in mid-March. The delays in deployment had a
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negative effect on the operation’s footprint, which was
lighter than envisioned. Instead of the full maneuver
battalion declared by the OPLAN as the target for IOC,
only a company size element without real maneuver
capability had been deployed in the French sector.
Additionally, situational awareness was minimal despite the CJSOTF’s effort, and the operation was hence
essentially blind. Moreover, Command and Control
(C2) was affected by delays in Communications and
Information Systems (CIS) equipment, which restricted communication between the Force Headquarters
and forward deployed elements. Finally, there was no
operational reserve, with the exception of a CJSOTF
Quick Reaction Force (QRF) with limited capability.
Despite these shortfalls, the Operation Commander
declared IOC, which was understood to be a political
rather than a military IOC.101
The UN mission, MINURCAT, faced even more difficulties. Protracted negotiations between the UN and
the Chadian government over specifics of the Chadian
police element caused great delays in MINURCAT’s
deployment. It thus became increasingly clear that an
integrated component of the international response,
the UN operation, would be significantly delayed.
PHASE 3: EXECUTION
The Execution Phase lasted from mid-March 2008
to mid-March 2009. It can be divided into three distinct
phases: IOC to Rainy Season (Mid-March to June); The
Rainy Season (July-October); and the Post-Rainy Season to Hand-Over (November-March).
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From IOC to Rainy Season (mid-March to
June 2008).
The Operation Plan had called for FOC to be
reached before the rainy season, during which deployment would become very difficult. Thus, one objective
for the period from mid-March to June was to consolidate deployment, as well as to take the necessary steps
to prepare for the rainy season. At the same time, EUFOR also attempted to seize opportunities to demonstrate its ability to tangibly affect the security environment. For the latter objective, May was declared to be
the decisive month by the Force Commander.
Increasing the Operation’s Footprint.
The buildup of the main force continued to be slow
even after IOC was declared.102 The “French” sectors
(central Chad and CAR sector) were the most advanced in buildup, while the remaining two sectors—
the “Irish” sector in the south (Goz Beida) and the
“Polish” sector in the north (Iriba)—experienced more
delays. The Irish sector, Multi-National Base-South
(MNB-South) became operational in mid-June, as the
main Irish elements arrived in the AOO in late May.
The buildup of the Polish sector experienced the most
difficulties, as water shortages continued to hamper
the deployment.103 At the same time, the deployment
of MINURCAT, and especially the UN training of
Chadian police officers, were further delayed due to
protracted negotiations between the UN and the GoC.
It thus became increasingly clear that EUFOR would
be a stand-alone force, rather than being embedded
into a multinational framework. This led to growing
frustration among EUFOR officials and further limited the operation’s footprint.
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Doubts About the Mission.
Despite the increase in EUFOR’s strength in the
field in May 2008, doubts about the mission surfaced.
EUFOR officials started questioning EUFOR’s ability to achieve its key objective of protecting civilians
and humanitarian actors.104 It became increasingly
clear to them that the greatest threat to civilians and
humanitarian organizations was banditry, which often involved local authorities, the Chadian military,
police or gendarmerie. As EUFOR’s mandate did not
entail addressing criminality (this was the task of the
MINURCAT-trained Chadian Police (DIS)), EUFOR
senior officials publicly wondered whether the right
force had been deployed.105
Doubts also arose on the issue of return of IDPs.
While according to the OPLAN, encouraging the voluntary return of IDPs was part of EUFOR’s mandate,
the humanitarian community was largely opposed
to many EUFOR actions that would encourage the
return of IDPs. While both EUFOR officials and humanitarian actors agreed on the desirability of IDP
returns, tensions arose over the timeline of such returns. EUFOR officials—pressed by the need to show
tangible results, which was most clearly articulated
by French Foreign Minister Kouncher—were eager
to undertake quick impact projects, which could possibly speed up the return process. This was critically
opposed by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs),
which argued that the conditions for return were not
achieved and stressed the need for voluntary return.
As tensions heightened, EUFOR officials reached out
to the humanitarian community and quietly dropped
the objective of encouraging the return of IDPs.
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Despite these doubts and the challenges in deployment of the main forces, by the beginning of the end
of the dry season the two French sectors (MNB-Center
and MNB-CAR) were fully operational, and the Irish
sector (MNB-South) became increasingly operational
with the arrival of the main elements in June (two
Irish infantry companies and one Dutch reconnaissance platoon). The main problem remained the north
Polish sector (MNB-North), which was plagued by a
combination of delayed deployment and difficulties
setting up the Polish Forward Operating Bases in Iribia in the northern part of the AOO due to water shortages. While some of the tasks were taken over by the
Combined Joint Special Operations Component Command (CJSOCC), an imbalance between the northern
sector and the rest of the AOO continued to exist, affecting the operation’s visibility and effectiveness.106
The Rainy Season (July 2008—October 2008).
In Chad, the beginning of the rainy season marks a
hiatus in fighting. As weather conditions make movements very difficult, the conflict between the GoC and
rebels is largely frozen. EUFOR’s commanders had
different plans, however. They saw the rainy-season
as an opportunity to highlight to the different armed
groups in the AOO that, unlike them, EUFOR was an
all-weather, fully mobile force, even under very difficult seasonal conditions. The rationale was to thereby
strengthen its deterrent effect and thus set the terms
for the end of the rainy season.
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Establishment of Joint Combined Operations.
This goal was, however, weakened by the fact that
EUFOR did not reach FOC before the onset of the rainy
season. Until September, MNB-CAR, MNB-South and
MNB-Center only combined a total strength of five
infantry companies and two reconnaissance platoons.
EUFOR commanders realized these operational
limitations and sought to offset them. Their solution
was to conduct Joint Combined Operations in successive areas, which were also meant to at least partially address the problem of criminality and stress
the multinational character of the European force.
Involving up to two companies, the operations lasted
up to 10 days.107 In July, the focus was Birao (MNBCAR), where EUFOR’s footprint was the smallest and
not multinational, as envisioned.108 Undertaking Joint
Combined Operations was thus meant to underline
Operation EUFOR TCHAD/RCA’s identity and to
temporarily offset the operational limitations of MNBCAR. Conducting combined operations in CAR was
however not an easy task, as national restrictions (caveats) complicated the task of achieving a combined
effort. Subsequently, Joint Combined Operations
shifted to the rest of the AOO.
Reaching Full Operational Capability.
With the arrival of the Polish main element, which
became operational in September, the Operational
Commander declared FOC of the deployed elements
in mid-September 2008. This allowed for a more balanced EUFOR presence in the AOO, and allowed for
a better situational awareness of the northern AOO, in
which many of the Sudanese refugees were located.
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However, even at full operational capability, the
number of troops available for operations was limited. This was partially due to the requirements of
force protection and a QRF.109 The redeployment of
the Swedish contingent (two infantry platoons)110 and
the drawdown of the forces assigned to the CJSOCC
further affected both force protection and the provision of QRFs—at both theater and battalion level.
Changes in the Security Environment.
This period was also marked by an increased concern over turmoil in Sudan. The Sudanese response
to the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) attempt
to seek criminal indictment of President Bashir was
difficult to forecast, which increased concerns about
large inflows of refugees into eastern Chad. This was
especially a concern given EUFOR’s lack of situational
awareness of western Sudan. This was partially due to
the lack of information exchange between EUFOR and
UNAMID on the operational level, despite EUFOR’s
attempts to establish official and/or unofficial links
between the two forces. Additionally, in combination
with the deterioration of relations between Chad and
Sudan in the aftermath of the failed attack by the Sudanese rebel group Justice and Equality Movement
(JEM) on Khartoum in May 2008, this raised concerns
about a possible indirect air-threat to EUFOR, particularly in Abéché, EUFOR’s operational center of gravity.111
While EUFOR continued to undertake operations
during the rainy season, both the Chadian Government and the rebels used the time to prepare for the
subsequent fighting season. The most important development during this phase was the ongoing shift of
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the balance of power in favor of the GoC. Most critically for the shift was the increased military procurement by the GoC in the aftermath of the February
rebel attack.112 The focus was to strengthen the close
air support capability of the Chadian Air Force by
purchasing fixed-wing (two Su-25 Frogfoot, one PC-9)
as well as rotary-wing (three MI-35 Hind) aircraft.113
The Chadian rebels on the other hand, continued to
suffer. They were further weakened by successful attempts by the GoC to rally rebels to the Government’s
camp.114 While the Government of Sudan provided additional equipment to the rebels—the lack of trust in
the rebels prevented the Government of Sudan from
handing over weaponry that would have allowed the
Chadian rebels to counter the increased Chadian airpower (e.g., man portable air defense systems [MANPADS]).
In sum, EUFOR’s ability to avoid a logistic paralysis and continue its operations during the rainy season
was a remarkable achievement in itself. Moreover the
joint combined operations appeared to be helpful in
extending EUFOR’s light footprint and thereby overcoming some of the existing lack of troops. They also
increased the deterrent effect in remote areas of low
EUFOR presence. The Joint Combined Operations
also had a positive effect by outlining the multinational identity of the force and enhancing trust building
between the various countries involved. At the same
time, however, they led to a better understanding of
the problems of insecurity in the AOO; though this
only confirmed the previous assessment that the problem of insecurity in eastern Chad had important structural origins, in which EUFOR had little ability to intervene. IDPs interviewed by EUFOR’s civil-military
coordination (CIMIC) teams expressed unwillingness

29

to return to their original areas for reasons that EUFOR was largely unable to solve or even address.115
End of Rainy Season to End of Operation.
The end of the rainy season in mid/late October
2008 allowed for the return of overall ground mobility and the resumption of criminality/banditry, interethnic clashes as a result of seasonal migration, as
well as rebel activity. The priority for EUFOR’s effort
in this period was two-fold. First, contribute to a safe
and secure environment, with a focus on preventing
outbreaks of interethnic clashes. Second, facilitate the
deployment of MINURCAT through cooperation so
as to optimise the conditions for the transition.
Extending the footprint further. In October 2008, the
emphasis on preventing interethnic clashes was linked
to seasonal factors. The beginning of the dry season
is the principal harvest season in Chad, which traditionally leads to strong competition and increased
tensions between nomadic breeders and sedentary
farmers. The focus lay on previously identified areas
where tensions were most likely to occur (southern
Wadi Fira, Ouaddai, and Dar Sila). While EUFOR was
supposed to be at full strength, due to relief in place
EUFOR experienced a temporary reduction of its
operational capability.116 To offset these and achieve
an extension of EUFOR’s footprint and underline its
multinational identity, additional combined joint operations were undertaken in select areas. These were
undertaken at different strength and command arrangements and were conducted in addition to “nomadic” long-range patrols to reach even remote parts
of the AOO. Additionally, in early January 2009, EUFOR’s tactical airlift capability, under strength during
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most of the operation, was reinforced by the arrival of
four Russian MI-8 Hip helicopters.
This period was also characterized by an increased
footprint of UN-trained Chadian police units (DIS) in
the AOO. After substantial delays in deployment, in
mid-November, about 200 DIS officers deployed in
the AOO.117 Difficulties remained, however, as DIS
units suffered from a lack of equipment, controversy
over salaries, and conflicts over jurisdiction with local
authorities. The actual effectiveness of the DIS units
in addressing some of the causes of insecurity in eastern Chad thus remained contested. Moreover, as the
envisioned DIS strength of 850 Chadian officers was
not reached before the end of EUFOR’s mandate, Operation EUFOR TCHAD/RCA remained essentially a
stand-alone operation.
Increase in interethnic clashes. The level of criminality/banditry decreased in November 2008 from previous hikes in late September/early October 2008. (The
September/October increase seemed linked to factors
external to the presence of European troops.)118 At
the same time, November experienced a significant
increase in interethnic violence. The most serious incidents took place in the northern AOO, especially
around the area of Birak, where clashes between Zaghawa and Tama ethnic groups occurred. Numerous
attacks of Tama villages by Zaghawa armed groups
led to the death and displacement of numerous Tama
and the destruction of crops and livestock.119 The attacks were significant as they involved up to 200 armed
men mounted on horses and camels and driving pickup trucks. In a response, EUFOR undertook Operation
WILMA, deploying forces in the area around Birak.120
While EUFOR’s presence improved the situation locally, and reassured NGOs/International Organiza-
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tions (IOs) working in the area, most ethnic Tama left
the area and refused to return, fearing further attacks.
There was also little illusion that the European force’s
ability to address the underlying causes of interethnic
violence was very limited. While in December levels
of violence decreased and interethnic clashes were
reduced, it was unclear whether this was a result of
seasonal factors or of increased presence in critical areas of both European, and perhaps more importantly,
Chadian forces.
Return of the Fighting Season.
Whereas a resumption of confrontation between
Forces Armées et de Sécurité (FAS) and rebels, including
another coordinated rebel attack on N’Djamena, was
expected, the situation remained uncharacteristically
calm. There are, however, doubts as to whether this
was related to EUFOR’s presence. Rather, the Chadian rebels, despite the establishment of a new coalition, continued to be weakened by internal disputes
and lack of cohesion. At the same time, the Chadian
Armed Forces reinforced their defensive layout in
eastern Chad, effectively blocking the major avenues
of approach. An increasingly unfavorable force ratio
appeared to have deterred any rebel attack. The lack
of means to counter the Chadian air superiority left
the rebels especially vulnerable.121 Finally, the rebels
also remained weakened as a result of defections to
the Chadian Armed Forces.
In sum, as EUFOR was fully operational, with the
return of the dry-season the force was able to conduct
numerous short- and long-range patrols that increased
the visibility of the force. This especially as EUFOR’s
footprint also extended over the entire AOO and its
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tactical airlift capability was reenforced by the availability of the Russian rotary-wing assets. Despite EUFOR presence, however, the fighting season returned,
and led in several cases to ethnic clashes, which resulted in civilian deaths. While EUFOR responded to the
most critical cases, Operation WILMA underlined that
EUFOR appeared ill-equipped to have a longer-term
effect on the security situation in the AOO. Moreover,
the situation had also changed substantially in comparison to previous years, as a more capable presence
of Chadian Armed Forces had changed the balance of
power on the ground.
PHASE 4: HAND OVER
The EU-led operation was officially handed over
to the UN follow-on force (FoF) on March 15, 2009.
The EU thereby followed through with its plan to stick
to the 12-months mandate—nearly independently of
UN readiness to take over the operation.
In Theory.
In principle, the concept of bridging operations
was in many ways conceived as mutually beneficial
for both the EU and the UN. For the EU, the limited
duration agreed upon from the outset of the operation
had a positive impact on the political willingness of
member states to participate. Presumably, without a
plausible exit strategy and fixed end-date, it is unlikely the operation would have been authorized by the
member states.122 For the UN, this arrangement provided—in theory—enough time to understand the requirements of the operation and find sufficient troops
to eventually undertake the operation. Moreover, the
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UN would take over an up and running operation, including infrastructure such as bases, contracts, and intelligence products. Finally, it also meant potentially
having some European states rehatting their troops to
the UN FoF. Against the background that the UN had
long sought to convince European troops to participate in its operations, the latter reason was seen as an
important benefit. As this was not the first time the
EU and UN had cooperated in an operation and various lessons learned processes had taken place, it was
hoped that the operation would set a new standard for
improved EU-UN cooperation in crisis management
operations.123
In Practice.
In practice, however, the handover from the EU to
the UN force was far from smooth, and both EU and
UN officials have been critical of the process. A key
reason for the handover process being considered unsuccessful by most EU officials was that by the time of
handover, the UN was not ready to take over the mission.124 While the FoF had been discussed at length between EU and UN officials, the UN Security Council
Resolution authorizing the follow-on force was only
passed in early 2009, leaving too little time to generate the mandated force of 5,200 troops.125 While European officials understood that the UN would thus
not be ready to take over the mission, the EU went to
great lengths to stick to its exit strategy. By putting
pressure on the UN, the EU ensured that at the least
the official handover would take place in accordance
with the EU’s OPLAN. At the same time, however,
this was only possible by convincing the participating member states to rehat. To achieve the promised
handover, EUFOR agreed to rehat nearly 90 percent of
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its troops to the UN FoF. Moreover, EUFOR handed
over infrastructure, including all its camps, to the UN.
It also agreed to keep a QRF for the first month at the
disposal of the UN force, and handed over parts of its
intelligence database to the UN. But, as European nations were interested in gradually withdrawing their
forces and the UN remained unable to replace them,
the number of forces available to the UN FoF eventually decreased from March 2009 to March 2010. The
UN FoF hence never reached its mandated strength of
5,200 troops.
In conclusion, the hand-over from the EU force to
the UN force was widely perceived as unsuccessful.
Despite the potential for mutual benefits of the concept of bridging operations, the operation underlined
the challenges of effective cooperation between the
EU and the UN in the field.
ASSESSMENT AND EVALUATION
Assessment.
The following part will attempt to evaluate how
effective the EUFOR was and what its strengths and
weaknesses were. It will also attempt to evaluate
whether the EUFOR’s shortcomings were due to its
own limitations, or whether they were the result of
and/or reflect larger problems with European security policy.
The key challenge in the assessment of stability operations is how to measure success. Unsurprisingly,
there is little agreement on what constitutes success.
Broadly speaking there are two approaches to measuring success.126 The first defines success narrowly
and focuses on the question of whether an operation’s
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mandate was fulfilled. The second defines success
more broadly to include the impact a stability operation has on the conflict it was meant to address. Both
approaches have merits and weaknesses. However,
given the absence of an accepted way of measuring
success the operation will be assessed through both
lenses.
Success Defined Narrowly.
In the narrow definition of success, the EU-led
operation could be considered successful if its abovestated objectives were reached. As described earlier,
the key objective of the EU-led operation stated in the
OPLAN was “to contribute to establishing a Safe and
Secure Environment (SASE) in the Area of Operation”
(emphasis added) in order to contribute to:
a. The protection of civilians in danger,
b. Facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid
and the free movement of humanitarian personnel
through improved security,
c. The protection of UN and associated personnel,
and
d. Encouraging the voluntary return of IDPs, especially in the Dar Sila region.
As in previous operations, however, measuring
the operation’s impact is difficult, not at least given
the absence of reliable statics. In Operation EUFOR
TCHAD/RCA, it can however be stated with a reasonable amount of confidence that EUFOR did positively impact the security situation for civilians, if only
marginally. The challenge in this case was to protect a
dispersed population in a very large area of operation.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that EUFOR’s largest
impact on civilian protection was in close proximity to
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its bases, including the five FOBs. Overall, however,
EUFOR’s impact was limited and should not be overstated. Since the mandate only called for a contribution
to the protection of civilians, even marginal improvements can be considered as contributions and hence a
fulfillment of the mandate.
As for the protection task of humanitarian personnel, we come to a similar finding. Protecting the
humanitarian organizations operating dispersed in
a very large area of operation from smaller threats
would have required either a large operational footprint or, alternatively, armed escorts. The EU force,
however, neither had a large operational footprint,
nor were most NGOs and IOs willing to accept armed
escorts, fearing that this would compromise their
“neutrality.”127 The alternative chosen by EUFOR—
communicating itineraries of its patrols to humanitarian actors—allowed it to provide some protection
to humanitarians.128 This impact should again not be
overestimated. Indeed some NGOs even reported an
increase in acts of criminality and banditry during
EUFOR’s presence.
The third objective, protecting UN personnel, lost
its relevance during most of the operation due to the
substantial deployment delays of the UN mission.
Finally, the objective of encouraging the voluntary return of IDPs was gradually dropped, as it led
to disputes and disagreement with the humanitarian community. It was in fact not uncontroversial, as
mentioned earlier. Though it appeared as an easy—
and quantifiable—measure of success, it was seen by
the humanitarian community—and some within EUFOR—as inadequate and problematic, as it put pressure on IDPs to return, which was seen by the humanitarian community as antithetical to voluntary return.
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In sum, if success is defined as the fulfillment of
the mandate, an argument can be made that, despite
its limited effect on the ground, EUFOR did contribute
to the protection of civilians in danger and humanitarians, and could thereby arguably be said to have met
the low threshold it had set for itself. The mandate in
fact set a very low bar for success, which would have
been difficult to miss.
Success Broadly Defined.
The overall assessment would, not surprisingly,
look different if a broader definition of success is used,
which would include the impact on the ground. In this
case, the overall marginal impact on the crisis is the
determining factor. Indeed if one uses such a definition of success, it could be argued that the operation’s
outcome was characterized by underachievement.
Five reasons for such an assessment stand out.
1. Evolving Situation on the Ground. First, the situation on the ground had evolved considerably by the
time the force became operational. The idea for the
force took shape in mid to the end of 2006, against a
background of widespread suffering of civilians—especially Sudanese refugees—in eastern Chad, which
was partially caused by cross-border raids by Sudanese militias.129 But within the 18 months it took to
get the force operational, the situation on the ground
looked little like 2006, and yet the operation’s political and military planning process continued with the
events of 2006 as its reference. In January 2008, when
the mission was finally launched, the AOO was characterized by intensive fighting between Chadian government forces and Chadian rebels at times, but civilians were not explicitly targeted by armed groups.130
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The situation thus differed substantially from the
situation military forces had confronted in Bosnia
and Herzegovina (1992-95) or Rwanda (1994), or even
neighboring Darfur. The result was a discrepancy between the force concept and mandate and the reality
on the ground.
2. Light Footprint. The second reason for EUFOR’s
underachievement was the very light footprint of the
force. EUFOR’s force-to-space ratio was only 0.018
troops per km2—a low figure in comparison to other stabilization operations.131 The limited number of
FOBs further limited the footprint in the AOO.132 This
was especially problematic as the threat was caused
by small rebel/militia groups and bandits, not large
military units, which meant that detecting and engaging them was akin to policing. This problem was partially addressed through short and long-range patrols,
which extended EUFOR’s presence and were more
adapted to the nature of the threat. Additionally, detecting the movements of small units of spoiler groups
required good situational awareness. But, while EUFOR had some organic intelligence assets at its disposal, its situational awareness was limited.133
3. Rigid Division between Military and Law and Order Tasks. Though, as mentioned above, the sources
of threat were mainly rebel groups and bandits, a
lack of flexibility concerning the blurred line between
military action and maintenance of law and order on
the military-strategic level of the operation hindered
EUFOR’s ability to adapt to a changing situation on
the ground. This was especially the case as the border
between these two types of operations is often blurred
and the areas of responsibility less clearly defined in
Chad and CAR. While EUFOR’s long-range “nomadic” patrols, which were similar to policing efforts in
Africa, were a step in the right direction, they were not
39

sufficient. Even as it became clear that EUFOR would
be a stand-alone operation,134 there was a reluctance
to adapt strategies to the changing situation on the
ground by allowing the military force to engage in law
and order activities. 135
4. Limited Mandate. The fourth reason for the marginal impact on the crisis was EUFOR’s limited mandate. The mandate authorized an isolated military
force, with no adequate political measures to complement the military presence. Given that there was no
peace to keep and no ongoing political reconciliation
process, the root causes of the conflict were not addressed. The absence of a broader strategy hindered
any possibility of a long-term effect on the situation on
the ground. As mentioned earlier, this was one of the
conditions for securing President Déby’s approval of
the force. This does not solve the serious problems of
sending a force with an inadequate mandate.
5. Short Duration. The final reason for the force’s
underachievement was the short duration of the operation. As stated earlier, the limited timeframe was
crucial for member states to sign on to the operation.
With no solid timeline and clear exit strategy, no European member state would have been likely to come
on board. On the other hand, given the particular circumstances of the operation—such as the lengthy and
delayed deployment and the long rainy season—the
actual time from when the force became fully operational (mid-September) to handover (mid-March) was
very brief and thus did not lend itself to achievements
on the ground.
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Evaluation.
Overall, the above assessment has shown that Operation EUFOR TCHAD/RCA had a marginal impact
on the crisis situation in eastern Chad and northeastern CAR. This does not necessarily mean that the operation was unsuccessful, however. Rather, depending on the definition of success different assessments
can be reached.
If one chooses the narrow definition of success, the
EU can claim that Operation EUFOR TCHAD/RCA
has been successful—at least militarily. This evaluation would be based on the fact that Operation EUFOR
TCHAD/RCA fulfilled it key objective of contributing
to the establishment of a safe and secure environment
in the AOO. This finding is perhaps unsatisfactory, as
it appeared to be nearly impossible for this objective
not to have been reached. It also appears to obscure
the fact that the European forces only had a marginal
effect on ground, or that the increased stability may
have been due to factors outside the force—such as the
drastic change in the balance of power on the ground
in favor of the Government of Chad.
The broader definition of success, which includes
the effect of the forces on the situation on the ground, is
hence preferred as a method of evaluating the success
of stability operations. If one uses this broader definition of success, the lack of impact on the ground casts
doubt on the finding that Operation EUFOR TCHAD/
RCA has been successful. Rather, several factors led to
shortfalls that overall led to underachievement. It is
worth noting, however, that the source of these shortcomings mostly falls within the political decisionmaking process prior to the launch of the operation.
Most importantly, these shortcomings were the lack of
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political willingness to engage in the political crisis in
Chad, lack of political willingness to engage militarily
for a longer period of time, and lack of political willingness to adequately resource the operation.
Against this background of preexisting shortfalls,
Operation EUFOR TCHAD/RCA was almost destined, from the outset, to have a limited effect on the
situation on the ground. Thus, the lack of impact on
the crisis is less to be found in the implementation
process, but in the process prior to the launch leading
to inherent limitations in the operation, which limited
the overall effect of the operation.

42

CHAPTER 2
LESSONS LEARNED AND FUTURE RELEVANCE
The previous chapter provided insights into the
largest and most complex EU-led military operation
in Africa. The aim of this chapter is to go a step further. As the EU is a relatively new security actor, it is
still in the process of establishing the institutions and
capabilities necessary to undertake complex military
operations. Thus in many ways, EU military operations can be seen as a “laboratory” in the development
of a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).136
As such, the lessons that can be drawn from
Operation EUFOR TCHAD/RCA—as well as other
operations—can give important insights into the state
of CSDP. But also, by exposing various strengths and
weaknesses they can give clues about the future trajectory of CSDP and its potential as a tool for developing Europe’s military capability.
This chapter is hence divided into two parts.
The first part will consider the lessons that can be
drawn from Operation EUFOR TCHAD/RCA. The
second part is concerned with the way forward for
CSDP.
LESSONS LEARNED
This section is divided into two subparts. First, lessons that can be drawn from the preparation phase of
the operation; and second, lessons that can de drawn
from the implementation phase of the operation.
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Preparation.
Before launching the operation, three critical steps
had to be undertaken: troops and enablers were generated (resourcing), an agreement on the common
costs was taken (funding), and the military planning
process took place (planning). In each, the operation
offered several lessons.
Resourcing. The EU itself has no significant autonomous military capabilities and thus needs to rely on
its member states to provide the needed troops and
enablers.137 Despite the relatively small scale of Operation EUFOR TCHAD/RCA, the EU had difficulties
finding sufficient resources to launch the operation.
Member states would not pledge sufficient troops and
enablers, and the force generation process dragged
on, embarrassingly, for months. This undermined the
credibility of the EU as a security actor. Several lessons can be drawn from this.
Political will is critical. While all EU member states
voted in favor of the operation, few were willing to
back their political support with significant military
commitments. Few member states felt nonhumanitarian interests were at stake in eastern Chad/CAR; and
hence, for most European states, EUFOR TCHAD/
RCA was a “discretionary” operation.138 Given competing claims for European forces from other operations, most states were reluctant to commit troops and
equipment for this operation.139 Of the 23 EU member
states participating in the operation, only four contributed more than 100 troops.140
As a result, the operation relied very heavily on
France, which provided 53 percent of the troops in addition to the largest share of tactical airlift, both fixed
and rotary-wing.141 France also became the lead nation in several fields, most notably becoming logistical
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lead nation, which entailed heavily supporting and
financially underwriting the deployment of other contingents.142 Though a similar problem exists within the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in relation
to the United States, the critical difference is that the
EU lacks a member state that dwarfs others in terms of
economic and military power. Thus, in the case of the
EU—and hence CSDP—if one or more of the larger
member states lack the political will to provide troops
and enablers, the other large member state(s) need to
provide a disproportionate national effort for the operation to be launched. As most EU operations so far,
and in the foreseeable future, are likely to be seen as
discretionary, this situation will not be exceptional. It
underlines the importance for at least one large member state to heavily support and be politically willing
to financially underwrite EU military operations.143
As mentioned earlier, this is not without problems in
the context of the EU. No EU member state has the
resources to play the role the United States plays in
NATO. In this case, the operation put extreme stress
on France, making it a very costly endeavor.144
Capability shortfalls continue to afflict even smallsize military operations. The lack of political will was
not the only cause of force-generation difficulties,
however. European states’ capability shortfalls in key
areas also seriously affect the EU’s ability to undertake operations. In addition to the well-known shortfalls in strategic airlift and deployable communication
and information systems (CIS),145 Operation EUFOR
TCHAD/RCA underlined growing problems with
deployable medical facilities and tactical airlift.
The lack of deployable medical facilities risks developing into a showstopper for future operations.146
As most European countries have either significantly
reduced or abolished their military hospitals and the
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demand for deployable units has increased, important
shortfalls surfaced. Additionally, medical standards
have remained largely unchanged since the Cold War.
Providing these standards of medical support in stability operations in remote locations is considerably
more difficult than providing them on national territories, however. These high standards of medical support also strongly limit the possibilities of enlisting
non-European providers to fill the gaps in European
capabilities in that area. These and other limitations
will be of even greater importance as the EU decides
to undertake larger military operations.
As for tactical airlift, the operation underlined increasing shortfalls in both fixed and rotary-wing assets. European tactical air fleets are aging and have
low serviceability rates due to the current operational
tempo. Meanwhile, their replacement programs—
such as the Airbus A400M and the NH-90—are plagued
by considerable delays, which will create gaps in the
near future.147 This is especially concerning as Operation EUFOR TCHAD/RCA and others before it have
underlined that outsourcing tactical airlift is far less
feasible than outsourcing strategic airlift. An alternative, used in this case, is to rely on non-EU member
states to provide lacking assets; this option has its limits, however.
Non-EU member states can reinforce some lacking
capabilities, but the EU will largely need to carry its
own weight. Given the challenges to generating troops
and critical enablers from EU member states, France
sought to help spread the burden and reinforce some
lacking capabilities—such as critical enablers (e.g.,
rotary-wing assets)—by calling on non-EU member
states.148 While three non-EU member states decided
to participate, the operation highlighted the limits of
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such involvement. The process of involving non-EU
contributors is long and cumbersome. As the participation of non-EU contributors is politically sensitive, it
requires political agreement among the member states
before discussions with the non-EU contributors can
even begin.149 Once they begin, a substantial amount
of time is needed to draw up detailed and complicated
technical agreements, which requires the participation
of a large number of actors.150 This process has to be
successfully concluded before the non-EU contributors can have access to key documents of the operation—including the CONOPS and OPLAN. This long
and cumbersome process is perhaps best highlighted
by the case of the Russian participation. From the point
of discussion on the EU political level to the participation of Russian troops the process lasted over a year,
and the troops only made it to theater 3 months before the end of the operation.151 In sum, judging from
Operation EUFOR TCHAD/RCA, it appears unlikely
that the EU could heavily rely on non-EU states in its
operations in the near future. EU states will have to
carry their own weight.
The EU Battlegroups (EUBGs), the EU’s standing
rapid reaction force, are unlikely to be used in their current form. As described in the previous chapter, there
were lengthy debates about whether the proposed operation could be a “Battlegroup situation,” meaning
an opportunity to validate the EUBGs in practice—especially as the initial concept had envisioned them for
bridging operations in Africa.152 Furthermore, the besttrained and equipped EUBG—the Nordic Battlegroup
(NBG) led by Sweden—was on stand-by in the first
half of 2008 when the operation was launched.153 A
showstopper, however, was the lack of political agreement in Stockholm and Brussels, which prevented the
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use of the NBG in Chad/CAR.154 This raised questions
about the EUBG concept, especially as the nonuse of
stand-by forces further limits the troops available for
deployment for an operation—given the low overall
number of deployable troops.155
Funding. A closely related, but separate issue in
the preparation phase is operational funding. As is
the case in NATO, the primary funding mechanism
for EU military operations is that nations absorb costs
associated with their participation (“costs lie where
they fall”). Exceptionally, some predetermined costs
are commonly financed through a mechanism known
as the Athena mechanism.156 As EU operations are undertaken by a “coalition of the willing,” the Athena
mechanism is an instrument that allows for a more
equitable division of the financial burden. In the case
of Operation EUFOR TCHAD/RCA, the definition of
common costs was particularly relevant as the costs
for the operation were exceptionally high, given the
remote location of the AOO, underdeveloped infrastructure, and the lack of host nation support. Though
difficult to calculate, the total costs are estimated to
have been as high as €1 billion (approx. $1.5 billion
U.S.).157 Of these, the total common costs were only
about €100 million ($145 million).158 With respect to
financing, at least two lessons can be drawn from Operation EUFOR TCHAD/RCA.
Common funding will remain a contentious issue
in the short-term.159 Prior to the launch of the operation, France was especially keen on broadening the
base for common funding. It was particularly interested in extending common costs to include strategic
airlift, select enablers (mainly rotary-wing assets) and
information acquisition (mainly air-to-ground sur-
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veillance).160 France’s request was not unusual, as in
some NATO operations these costs are commonly financed.161 However, prior to and during the operation,
these attempts to broaden common costs failed. The
other large EU member states were especially unwilling to bankroll the operation.162 Contributing states
thus needed to cover the costs of their deployment
and sustainment.163 Subsequent efforts by the French
EU presidency to extend funding for EU operations
more generally were also largely unsuccessful.164 Thus
the EU definition of common costs will likely remain
more restrictive than NATO’s, at least in the near future.
Extending common funding is not a silver bullet.
While it is often assumed that extending common
funding would solve the participation gap, the nonuse
of the EU NBG in Operation EUFOR TCHAD/RCA
was particularly enlightening in this regard. The nonuse of the NBG was importantly linked to Germany
and the UK’s unwillingness to sign off on its deployment. While several factors certainly played into this
position, their unwillingness was crucially linked to
the extended common funding specifically granted to
the Battlegroups in order to facilitate their use.165 This
would have meant an increased burden for the larger
EU member states—especially Germany and the UK.
In other words, extended funding, meant to facilitate
the use of the Battlegroups, in fact made their use
less likely.166 There is reason to believe that extending
common costs in operations would have a similar effect—that is decrease the likelihood of political support for an operation from EU member states that are
unwilling to contribute. As unanimity is required to
launch operations, the likelihood of blockage would
increase.167
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Planning. A final critical aspect in the preparation
phase is the military planning of an operation. In the
absence of permanent structures, EU military operations have consistently experienced difficulties.168 The
question of a permanent EU Headquarters has, in fact,
become the site of heated debates. Operation EUFOR
TCHAD/RCA offers several lessons.
The absence of permanent planning capacity hinders the planning of EU military operations. In the
absence of permanent planning structures, the planning of EU operations will continue to experience difficulties. These existed on a number of levels. The first
set of challenges was related to the role and capacity
of the EU Military Staff (EUMS). While the EUMS is
meant to support the planning process in the predecision phase—by contributing to the Crisis Management
Concept (CMC) and drafting the Military Strategic
Options (MSO)—it has very limited capacity to undertake detailed military planning. Despite this limited
capacity, however, the EUMS had to conduct detailed
military planning, mainly due to the excessively slow
build-up of the Operational Headquarters (OHQ).169
A second related challenge was the activation
of the OHQ. The EU has five national OHQs. Once
a decision is made to launch an operation, a decision has to be made as to which one of these OHQs
will be activated. That OHQ then has to be activated
and “multinationalized”—a process, which has been
lengthy in the past. While the OHQ was activated
comparatively early in the planning process for operation EUFOR TCHAD/RCA, the late designation of the
Operation Commander (OpCdr) limited the effect of
the early activation.170 Arriving nearly 1 1/2 months
after the OHQ activation, the OpCdr was not familiar with the previous months of political and military
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deliberations on the operation. Thus, while a skeleton
CONOPS and OPLAN existed upon his arrival, the
OpCdr requested additional time to familiarize himself with previous months of political and military deliberations. The buildup of the OHQ was also slowed
by the lengthy process of multinationalization of the
OHQ. National augmentees arrived late and were often unaware of CSDP concepts and procedures. As a
result, it took 2 months to put together 90 percent of
the OHQ staff.171 Two months later, the first to arrive
had already been relieved, each being recalled by their
national commands.172 In sum, the planning process
lacked harmony and contributed to delays in launching the operation, which was mostly due to the lack of
permanent planning arrangements.
The existing alternatives are limited. Two institutional alternatives to activating a national HQ exist, in
theory. The operation underlined that neither the EU
Operations Centre (EU OpsCentre) nor NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE)
are usable alternatives in practice.
The EU OpsCentre is meant to plan and run a particular operation when no national HQ is identified.
The EU OpsCentre is not a standing, fully manned
HQ, but can be fairly rapidly activated.173 Operation
EUFOR TCHAD/RCA underlined that, paradoxically,
the very reason that ensures the EU OpsCentre’s rapid
activation—namely that it draws heavily on the EU
Military Staff—is the reason it is unlikely to be used in
an operation in its current configuration. Prior to the
Chad/CAR operation, the Chairman of the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and the Director-General of
the EUMC urged France not to seek an activation of
the EU OpsCentre. The reason was simple: Given the
strain the activation would have put on the EUMS, the
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use of the EUOpsCenter for the operation was considered inconceivable. 174
The other available alternative, using NATO’s
SHAPE through the Berlin-Plus agreement, was not
seriously considered for the operation in Chad/CAR.
Aside from challenges arising from the Turkish-Cypriot dispute, the arrangement in its current configuration is largely perceived to be too cumbersome.175
While the current arrangement appears to be workable in situations where the EU is taking over a NATO
operation, such as Operation EUFOR ATHENA, additional coordination, though burdensome, is required.
The same is not true for operations without current or
previous NATO participation.
Implementation.
The successful implementation of the mission
depended on several critical dimensions: the force
needed to be deployed and sustained in theater (Logistics), put under the authority and directed by a
properly designated commander (Command, Control
and Communication [C3]), provided with situational
awareness (Intelligence), and coordinate with civilian counterparts (Comprehensive Approach). Given
the challenges of the operation, especially the inhospitable environmental conditions, several important
lessons can be drawn.
Logistics.176
As described earlier, EUFOR TCHAD/RCA tested
the limits of European logistical capabilities. The key
logistical challenge in the operation was to deploy and
sustain forces in a very challenging environment with
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poor transport infrastructure and lack of host-nation
support.177 Capturing the complexity of this task, the
Chairman of the EUMC described the logistics for
Operation EUFOR TCHAD/RCA as “an operation
within an operation.”178
As in NATO operations, logistical support to deployed troops and equipment remains a national responsibility. This created its own challenges in this
operation as, aside from France, it was the first broad
military experience in Africa for most of the participating European countries.179 Several lessons can be
drawn from the experience.
The importance, and limits, of a Logistical Lead Nation.
Given the logistical challenges of the operation, the
existence of a logistical lead nation in facilitating the
deployment and sustainment of participating states
was critical. France possessed unique capabilities that
allowed it to assume the role of an effective logistical lead nation.180 The combination of considerable
operational experience in Africa and the presence of
prepositioned forces in Chad (Operation EPERVIER)
and in Central African Republic (Operation BOALI)
allowed France to play this critical role. France supported the deployment of participating states, by putting readily available bases, hospitals, communication
assets and means of transportation at the disposal of
other participating countries. During the deployment
phase, French Operation EPERVIER committed more
than half of its 1,200 troops to facilitate EUFOR’s deployment.181 Similarly, France played a critical role in
facilitating the sustainment of all forces during the operation. As the framework nation, France was responsible for several critical items and services, 182 which
eased some of the logistical burden and enabled the
involvement of some of the participating states. The
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function fulfilled by the logistical lead nation was so
critical in this case that it is hard to conceive both deployment and sustainment absent France’s role.
While the operation validated the concept of a logistical lead nation, it also posed important questions.
It highlighted that the bar for assuming the role of
lead nation is high. The lead nation has to be politically committed, not only to commit the largest force,
but also willing to financially underwrite the operation.183 Moreover, the lead nation needs to possess the
adequate national competence to undertake this role.
This limits the number of EU states that could play
this very important role. Currently, aside from France,
it is unlikely any other member state would be willing
and able to assume this critical role.
The need for greater mutualization in logistics. In many
ways, the cooperation, coordination, and logistical
support between the different participating members
was encouraging. From the beginning, there was an
emphasis on coordination to achieve maximum efficiency by using multinational solutions for logistics.
Moreover, during the operation, larger troop contributing countries supported smaller contingents. Thus,
France provided full support to Slovenia and Albania,
Poland to Croatia, and Ireland to the Netherlands.184
Also, the readiness of mutual support between the
countries in terms of airlift or use of national equipment by other nations had positive effects on cooperation.185 Notwithstanding, the operation underlined the
overall need for greater mutualization between the
different troop contributing countries. This could at
least partially be achieved by making increased use of
already existing instruments, such as the Movement
Coordination Centre Europe (MCCE).186
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The importance, and limits, of outsourcing logistics. As
in previous EU military operations, outsourcing of logistics to private contractors played an important role
in the operation.187 In Operation EUFOR TCHAD/
RCA, major functions including catering services
and camp management, but also strategic transport
and intratheater lift were entrusted to private providers.188 Thus, unsurprisingly, the costs of outsourcing amounted to a significant portion of the overall
costs of the operation.189 The outsourcing of strategic
transport—both strategic airlift and strategic sealift—
played a particularly important role in Operation
EUFOR TCHAD/RCA.190 Moreover, outsourcing also
played a critical role in the overland transport through
the Douala Corridor to N’Djamena.191 This allowed reducing the number of troops otherwise required for
these tasks.
At the same time, however, Operation EUFOR
TCHAD/RCA underlined that outsourcing is not a
silver bullet in solving European logistics problems.
First, outsourcing logistics is relatively expensive; it is
questionable whether outsourcing logistics to private
contractors is a way to save costs.192 Second, outsourcing logistics can limit flexibility and reduce responsiveness in case of unforeseen circumstances.193 Third,
outsourcing logistics is not always feasible. The operation underlined especially the limitations in outsourcing tactical lift to private contractors.
Command, Control, and Communications (C3). As in
previous EU military operations, the command and
control organization for Operation EUFOR TCHAD/
RCA was complex, but unified. Figure 2 provides an
overview of the command and control and coordination architecture of the operation.
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Figure 2. Overview of Command and Control and
Coordination Architecture.194
The EU’s Political and Security Committee (PSC)
exercises the political control and provides the strategic direction for the military operation. At the
military-political level, the Chairman of the Military
Committee (CEUMC) is responsible for providing the
PSC with military advice.195 The headquarters at this
level is the EU Military Staff. At the operational level,
the OpCdr uses the OHQ and at the theater level, the
Force Commander (FCdr) uses the Force Headquarters (FHQ).
Initially deployed under national command, EUFOR troops came under the authority of the EU when
the EU formally assumed control of the operation.
Thereafter, depending on their size, national contingents maintained their own internal command structure. Each contingent commander reported to the
FCdr in the FHQ in Abéché,196 who reported to the
OpCdr in the OHQ in Paris. The OpCdr and his staff
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at OHQ then made regular reports to the EU Military
Committee and the Political and Security Committee
in Brussels. Two lessons can however be learned from
the conduct of the operation in terms of C3:
1. Complex Command and Control Architecture. Overall, the command and control structure, with the strategic decisionmaking centre in Brussels, the strategic
command (OHQ) near Paris, France, and the operational command (FHQ) in Abéché, Chad, proved to
be complex and unwieldy. This given, it appears to
be preferable for the OHQ and FHQ command levels to be provided by the same member state.197 This
appeared to have allowed for better coordination between the strategic and operational command than in
Operation EUFOR RD CONGO, where the OHQ and
FHQ were held by two different nations (Germany
and France, respectively).198 Partially due to this, the
critical OHQ-FHQ relationship was notably better in
EUFOR TCHAD/RCA, which allowed the Force Commander to conduct his military mission without being
micromanaged by a remote committee structure.
2. The Difficulties of Establishing Communications in
the Field. In addition to the complexity growing out
of the command and control architecture, the difficulties in establishing secure communication within the
chain of command negatively affected efficient and
effective command and control. Despite France’s important role as the commmunications and information
systems (CIS) lead nation, there was an initial lack of
secure communications within the chain of command.
While the communication links between the OHQ and
FHQ worked well, the links between FHQ and the
FOBs were limited during the first months of the operation, and thereby limited communications within
the chain of command.199 These challenges were only
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overcome when France provided the technical assets
needed to establish computers and phone connections
to EUFOR’s battalions to communicate with the FHQ.
And though the lead nation model eventually seemed
to work in this case, its usability for larger operations
is questionable, given the limitations in CIS capacity
already underlined in this operation.
The negative effects of caveats. The operation also
underscored that, as in previous operations, national
restrictions (caveats) negatively affect the Force Commander’s ability to employ and use forces in theater.200
While the participating states agreed to common
Rules of Engagement (ROE), all troop contributing
states placed restrictions on the use of their forces. In
the given operation, caveats differed, ranging from restrictions on deployment locations, to use of force.201
While most of the caveats were disclosed when the
forces were transferred to EUFOR control, the National Contingent Commanders (NCC) retained the
authority to place additional restrictions on their employment. Both stated and unstated caveats, however,
further complicated the task of employing and using
forces in theater.202
Intelligence.203
The collection and analysis of intelligence is a critical factor in any military operation. At the same time, it
also represents one of the most sensitive issues in multinational operations, and is known as an area where
European shortfalls exist.204 As in previous operations, intelligence support consisted of three bodies:
the organic intelligence assets of EUFOR Tchad/RCA,
the national supporting arrangements with National
Intelligence Liaison Officers (NILO) and National In-
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telligence Cells (NICs), and intelligence support by
the EU, mainly the EUMS and the EU Satellite Center (EUSC).205 Furthermore, the operation established
intelligence liaison arrangements with other actors in
the field.

Figure 3. Intelligence Architecture.206
Given the large AOO and the complex and volatile
political situation, there was an important need for the
operation to gain situational awareness. Thus, supporting the operation by developing and maintaining
the best possible situational awareness was a key task
for the intelligence community. This was required for
both force protection reasons (e.g., understanding of
potential military/security/criminal threats against
EUFOR) and for EUFOR to fulfill its mandate. Several
lessons in regards to intelligence can be drawn from
the operation.
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The need to provide an operation with adequate organic
collection assets. The operation underlined that the EU
member states continue to have difficulties providing
the necessary intelligence collection assets to an operation. While the operation benefitted in terms of imagery intelligence (IMINT) from the availability of assets
from French Operation EPERVIER (Mirage F1CR),207
EUFOR’s organic collection IMINT assets were limited. This was partly related to the relatively low
number and range of the available unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs).208 Even more limited was EUFOR’s
organic human intelligence (HUMINT) capability, as
few HUMINT teams were provided. Finally, EUFOR
had no permanent sensor with signal intelligence (SIGINT) capability. Requested assets, such as equipped
maritime patrol aircraft (MPA), were not provided
by the member states. Given the very few available
organic collection assets, the provision of permanent
intelligence support from the EU member states was
critical for the operation, which was, however, not
easy.209
The need for improved intelligence sharing. Despite the
need for intelligence from EU member states, the operation highlighted the continued reluctance in intelligence sharing.210 To smooth the process and encourage
enhanced intelligence sharing, France, as intelligence
framework nation, was responsible for coordination
with the intelligence services of the participating
states. Yet intelligence cooperation was challenging,
especially at the operational level. As in previous operations, participating member states deployed NICs
in theater, which remained under national command
lines.211 NICs were meant to complement EUFOR’s
intelligence picture through national channels.212 The
relationship was meant to be mutually beneficial, as
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NICs needed information from EUFOR collection assets to provide national authorities with information.213
Despite this, the cooperation between EUFOR and the
NICs deployed in theater was difficult. As no formal
arrangements for intelligence provision were provided, EUFOR needed to rely on the goodwill of NICs
to share intelligence. A mutual reluctance to exchange
information and/or intelligence, however, prevented
effective cooperation. Thus, at the operational level,
senior EUFOR officials considered the contributions
of the NICs to the operation to be limited at best.214
The need to strengthen the EU Satellite Center
(EUSC).215 In terms of cooperation with EU agencies,
the cooperation with the EUSC was perceived to have
worked well. The EUSC’s involvement at an earlier
stage than in previous operations and its access to
French Helios II satellite imagery for the operation
proved to be important steps forward. The EUSC was
able to provide the operation with both satellite imagery, and, especially important in the early phase of the
operation, accurate maps. At the same time, however,
the operation also underlined that further improvements could increase the impact of the EUSC on EU
military operations. The role of the EUSC in supporting operations was limited by the fact that it was,
largely for technical reasons, only linked to the OHQ.
Thus, while the OHQ could request satellite IMINT
from the EUSC, the Force Headquarters could only
benefit from the EUSC indirectly through the OHQ.
Moreover, the operation also underlined the limited
capacity of the EUSC. The EUSC mobilized about 60
percent of its capacity in support of Operation EUFOR
TCHAD/RCA.216 Given that the EU has set itself the
goal to participate in simultaneously in two larger
stability operations, the EUSC capacity appears too
limited.
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The need for cooperation with other actors on the ground.
Finally, the operation underlined the importance of
liaison and information exchange arrangements with
IOs and NGOs in the field, given their knowledge of
the situation on the ground. In this regard, EUFOR’s
Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) teams played a
critical role for EUFOR. Shortfalls existed, however, in
regards to liaison and information exchange arrangement with UNAMID, the UN force on the other side
of the border in Darfur. Given the unwillingness of
UNAMID to share information with EUFOR on an operational level,217 EUFOR’s understanding of the situation in Darfur was limited at best. Given the multiple
links with the situation in Darfur, the lack of links
between the two forces on the operational level was
problematic.218
Comprehensive Approach. Increasingly, military
forces are required to coordinate with their civilian
counterparts in the conduct of operations. The EU,
which has both civilian and military instruments at
its disposal, has recognized the importance of such
a comprehensive approach in its operations. Despite
this, however, the EU has had difficulty achieving a
truly comprehensive approach in previous operations.
Overall, Operation EUFOR TCHAD/RCA underlines
that these challenges continue. More specifically, two
lessons can be drawn from the operation in regards to
the achievement of a comprehensive approach:
1. Difficulties integrating different instruments in the
field. The Operation underlined that the EU continues
to have difficulties integrating its different instruments in the field. While in the planning phase attempts were made to include a wider range of tools,
including development tools, in the field integrating
the multiple instruments proved difficult. While the
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European Commission, through its funds (Instrument
for Stability and the European Development Fund)
supported the operation—most importantly providing
€10 million for the deployment and training of Chadian special police units under the UN mission219—the
integration of developmental and security policies, for
example, remained largely elusive during the course
of the operation.220 Cooperation between EUFOR and
the European Commission (EC), responsible for the
EU’s development policy in Chad/CAR in the field,
remained difficult.221 The strained relationship in the
field was at least partially an extension of the bureaucratic divide in Europe between those responsible for
security and for developmental policy.222 Beyond the
bureaucratic divide, there also appears to be a greater
conceptual divide in Europe. The tendency to maintain a clear division between developmental and security policies and thereby maintain the independence
of developmental policy, remains a key objective for
European development agencies both on an EU and
national level.223
2. The relationship with NGOs was difficult. Particularly in regards to cooperation in the field. From the onset
of the operation, the relationship between EUFOR and
the NGOs was difficult. This partially reflected generally difficult relations between military and humanitarian organizations. While operating in the same
context, most NGOs did not share the same perspective and, above all, used very different means. Many
NGOs, in the humanitarian and other areas, were in
fact often reluctant to work alongside EUFOR—even
though some of these NGOs had requested military
assistance to stabilize the situation. However, beyond
these general challenges, the relationship between EUFOR and the NGOs was strained for other reasons.224
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Though relations between EUFOR and the NGOs had
improved significantly towards the end of the operation, which allowed the above mentioned informationsharing, many NGOs appear to have remained critical
of EUFOR’s overall achievements.225
THE WAY FORWARD
Operation EUFOR TCHAD/RCA has revealed numerous outstanding challenges and existing shortfalls
in the EU and it members’ ability to undertake difficult military operations. Many of these issues are not
limited to EU-military operations, and often affect European participation in NATO operations as well. Yet,
as the United States fills existing gaps in NATO operations, EU nations’ actual challenges and shortfalls are
masked.226 EU military operations, on the other hand,
tend to expose these difficulties more forcefully.
By doing so, EU military operations have in fact
played—and will continue to play—a very important role in the development of the CSDP. By stressing existing shortfalls, they offer the opportunity and
justification for capability improvements.227 To many
in the EU, military operations are seen primarily as a
laboratory in which various aspects of CSDP are tested and subsequently improved. Indeed, this has been
the modus operandi of the CSDP over the past 10 years,
as CSDP has largely been driven by the EU’s military
operations.
By highlighting the challenges of expeditionary operations, Operation EUFOR TCHAD/RCA—like others before it—has provided many important learning
opportunities for both EU institutions and EU member states. It has already served as a catalyst for capability improvements and initiatives in a number of
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areas. These improvements have largely been achieved
through strengthening existing institutional arrangements, pooling of resources, and harmonization of
capabilities. Examples include efforts to strengthen
the planning capacity of both the EU Council Secretariat (by establishing a Crisis Management Planning
Directorate (CMPD) and the EU Military Staff. These
improvements could prove important in future EU
military operations—and help avoid some of the planning difficulties identified above.228
The operation also helped launch concrete schemes
to improve existing capabilities, most importantly the
establishment of the Franco-British helicopter initiative. The initiative, which aims at increasing the availability of helicopters for military operations, was born
out of the lack of helicopters in previous operations—
including Operation EUFOR TCHAD/RCA.229 By providing funding to upgrade existing helicopter fleets in
select European countries, its aim is to increase their
use in operations. The operation also had an impact
on important pooling initiatives. By underlining the
problems in tactical airlift the operation helped speed
up the process of the establishment of the European
Air Transport Command (EATC) in early 2010.230 As
one of the most important recent pooling initiatives,
the EATC will combine the fixed-wing transport fleets
of four European countries (Germany, France, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) under a single operational command in Eindhoven.231
New initiatives are not always immediately successful, however. Thus, while the operation also led to
a renewed debate on how to increase the usability of
the EU stand-by force, the EUBGs,232 and to the launch
of several initiatives to reform the current common
funding mechanism to improve its effectiveness,233
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these two issues remain largely unresolved. At the
same time however, the establishment of the EATC
outlined above, whose origins date back over 10 years,
is an example of how even incremental steps can lead
over time to significant changes.234
The above examples all show how EU operations
help lead to what the former Chief Executive of the
European Defence Agency (EDA) called a “point of
critical mass of impatience,” that is a point where
European policymakers get together and start to seriously tackle outstanding issues.235 This is certainly no
coincidence. As mentioned earlier, for many European officials the benchmark for success of EU military
operations is how far these operations advance the
European defense project and contribute to building
institutions and capabilities for a militarily stronger
Europe. Their impact on a crisis on the ground—especially if does not affect important European interests—is often only secondary. These operations are
thus seen as part and parcel of the larger European
project, and they both contribute to and benefit from
their integration in the larger EU edifice.
This view is clearly problematic in the assessment
of the EU’s effectiveness in addressing given crises—
in this case the crisis in Chad and CAR. 236 It does,
however, illustrate a mindset among European policy
elites that serves as a critical driver for the transformation of Europe into an increasingly capable security
actor.
The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in early
2010 should provide the CSDP with renewed momentum. As mentioned above, EU operations suffer from
issues linked to political will, inadequate institutional
arrangements, and capability shortfalls. By opening
new institutional avenues for increased defense coop-
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eration (in the framework of the Permanent Structure
Cooperation) and establishing a European diplomatic
service (known as External Action Service) the Lisbon
Treaty could help address some of the problems identified earlier.237 Whether or not improvements actually
materialize will remain to be seen; but the potential
for transformation exists.
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CHAPTER 3
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY
The demilitarization of Europe—where large swaths
of the general public and political class are averse to
military force and the risks that go with it—has gone
from a blessing in the 20th century to an impediment
to achieving real security and lasting peace in the
21st.”238
		
		

Robert M. Gates,
U.S. Secretary of Defense

For the past half century, U.S. policy has been
largely supportive of a more cohesive Europe that
could effectively act as America’s partner on the European continent and beyond.239 Yet, since Europeans
moved to establish an increasingly “common” security and defense policy, U.S. policy has become more
ambivalent. On the one hand, U.S. policy is often supportive, and, on the other, a more skeptical to outright
hostile attitude towards the CSDP has existed in parallel. The sources of this ambivalence towards CSDP
at least partially reflect remaining sentiments of nostalgia about the transatlantic relationship in the Cold
War.
The ambivalence has also translated into lack of
coherence and consistency in U.S. policy towards the
CSDP. This inconsistency comes at an increasingly
high price, however. The changes in the post- 9/11
security environment create a greater need for allies
to address existing security challenges and place a
greater importance on U.S. cooperation with its allies,
most importantly its most capable allies in Europe.
It is against this background that U.S. policymakers
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need to reevaluate the current U.S. policy towards the
EU’s CSDP, and develop a much-needed coherent and
consistent long-term strategy vis-à-vis its European
allies, in line with today’s U.S. interests.
POLICY OPTIONS
Broadly speaking, the United States has three options in responding to the EU’s Common Security and
Defense Policy:
1. Opposing the CSDP
2. Neutral Stance
3. Embracing the CSDP.
The three options are distinct and reflect different
rationales and assumptions.
Option 1: Opposing the CSDP.
This strategy would entail a policy that aims to
weaken the CSDP. The strategy’s objective would be
to attempt to hinder and/or prevent the EU’s CSDP
from succeeding. Behind this option is the assumption
that a militarily strong Europe would be harmful to
U.S. national interests. In the best case, the CSDP is
seen as a distraction from serious security challenges,
in the worst case as a sinister effort to counter U.S.
influence in Europe.240
Option 2: Neutral Stance towards the CSDP.
This strategy would entail a policy that adopts a
less activist stance towards the CSDP and takes a “wait
and see” attitude. The strategy’s objective would be
neither to weaken nor to strengthen the CSDP. The
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rationale behind this choice would be the assumption
that whether or not the EU becomes a capable security actor is of limited importance to the United States.
Thus, rather than spending political capital on either
opposing or supporting the EU aspirations, the United
States should merely be a bystander in the process and
react to the outcomes.
Option 3: Embracing the CSDP.
This option entails a policy that aims to cultivate a
stronger CSDP. The strategy’s objective would be to
actively engage with and try to strengthen the current
development of a common European security and defense policy. The assumption behind this choice is that
a militarily capable EU is commensurate with U.S. interests. Moreover, the value-added by a more capable
Europe would balance the potential loss of U.S. dominance over European security policy.
Analysis.
In evaluating these three options, two questions
are key: (1) Is a militarily strong Europe in the U.S.
national interest? and (2) Does the CSDP have the potential to strengthen Europe militarily?
The strategies of opposition and the neutral stance
either assume that a militarily strong Europe is not in
the U.S. national interest and/or that even if it were,
the CSDP’s ability to strengthen Europe militarily is
limited. The strategy of support is underpinned by the
assumptions that a militarily strong Europe is in the
U.S. national interest and, importantly, that the CSDP
is a vehicle that can deliver the much-needed capability.
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Is a militarily strong Europe in the U.S. national interest? The answer to this question is perhaps more
evident if the question is formulated slightly differently, namely: Is a militarily weak Europe in the U.S.
national interest? On this question, a wide consensus
emerges. Both policymakers and wider policy/academic circles largely agree that a militarily weak Europe would be detrimental to U.S. national interests.
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recently explained
it eloquently: “The demilitarization of Europe . . . has
gone from a blessing in the 20th century to an impediment to achieving real security and lasting peace in
the 21st.”241
Underlying this view is an important assumption.
Namely, that basic American and European values
and interests have not diverged—not at the end of the
Cold War, and not after 9/11.242 Today, Europe finds
itself confronted with the same threats arising from
the new security environment. For Europe, as for the
United States, weak, failing, or failed states will constitute the major security challenge in the near future.243
This new security environment places great emphasis on stability operations, for which many European
forces are well-suited.244
Hence, a Europe that is able and willing to take on
more responsibility for managing crises, with less reliance on the United States, would be an asset to U.S.
foreign policy. It would allow Europeans to tackle
security problems where and when the United States
cannot or would rather not get involved. This would
reduce American burdens in Europe and make Europe
a better and more capable partner.245 At the same time,
fears that Europe could turn into a superpower competitor to the United States are unfounded. Europe
has neither the resources nor the appetite to become
a superpower.
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In sum, there appears to be wide agreement that
the development of a militarily strong Europe is in
the U.S. national interest. This finding puts into question some of the assumptions of the first two policy
options, namely that a militarily stronger Europe is
either not in the U.S. interest or does not affect U.S.
interests. On the other hand, it puts stronger emphasis
on the question of how Europe can become militarily
stronger and whether the CSDP is the right vehicle for
it.
Can the EU deliver? The second question is whether
the EU’s CSDP can be a vehicle that delivers a militarily strong Europe. Given the recognized lack of
progress NATO has achieved in respect to capability
improvements, skepticism appears well placed. At the
same time however, there are several reasons to believe that the EU has the potential to deliver both the
political will and the military capability to facilitate,
through the CSDP, the development of a militarily
stronger and more proactive Europe.
First, as highlighted in the previous chapter, the
CSDP has a remarkable track record. In a relatively
brief period of time, through the CSDP, the EU built
both the political support and the necessary institutions (EUMS, EUMC, EUSC, EDA) to conduct increasingly challenging military operations far beyond Europe’s borders.
Second, the EU label appears to mobilize Europeans to spend money on boosting military capabilities
in a way that NATO could not.246 The CSDP is widely
seen as a critical element in Europe’s aspiration of
building an ever closer union; it is hence seen as part
of the larger European edifice. In addition to the broad
political support for the project, the CSDP also emphasizes the development of expeditionary capability,
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not at least because the territorial defense of Europe
remains the undisputed key function of NATO.247 In
regard to its expeditionary goals, the EU has recently
specified its headline goal. Over the next years, the EU
set itself the ambition to be able to plan and conduct
two major stabilization operations of up 10,000 troops
simultaneously.248 The significance of this ambition
lays in the fact that it is born out of a European initiative, rather than dictated by Washington. As such, it
may be easier for European nations to receive domestic support for the necessary defense budgets if the assets are billed for the EU headline goal as opposed to
NATO’s force goals.249
Third, the opportunities to free ride are more
limited in the EU. A more equitable distribution of
economic and military power among the EU’s larger
member states limits the possibility for one state to
bear a disproportionate share of the burden.250 The result is greater peer pressure for a more equitable share
in the CSDP. This is especially true as the EU member states cooperate on a wide range of policy areas,
where they require each other’s support. The more equitable power distribution also creates the impetus for
pooling schemes that would maximize resources and
produce the needed capabilities.
While the abovementioned reasons suggest that
the EU’s CSDP could strengthen Europe militarily,
it remains to be seen if it can live up to its potential.
Even if it does, the progress is, in the absence of a major crisis in Europe’s immediate periphery, likely going to be slow. It would thus require the United States
to show an unprecedented level of patience.251
At the same time, however, the CSDP’s potential
should be seen against the background that current
U.S. efforts in European capability improvement are
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largely stagnant. Despite enormous U.S. political efforts, most European states have still not fully subscribed to the U.S.-led reform process in the post-Cold
War era. Thus, any institution facilitating greater reform efforts—possibly due to a stronger sense of European ownership of the process—offers at least the
possibility of improvement of the current situation.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the above assessment, this monograph
recommends the third option: embracing the EU’s
CSDP. This recommendation is based on the following key findings:
• The new security environment increasingly
requires cooperation between allies to address
emerging security threats;
• A militarily stronger Europe that carries a greater share of global responsibility is an important
asset for U.S. foreign policy;
• The EU’s CSDP has the potential to deliver the
political will needed for a militarily more proactive Europe;
• The CSDP may thus be critical to overcoming
the EU’s recognized stagnation in capability improvements and mobilizing serious European
capabilities development.
Practical Steps.
To be successful, practical steps that entail shifts
in U.S. thinking as well as organization are required.
First, establish the necessary capacities to strengthen
the U.S. understanding of the EU’s CSDP, to overcome
existing blind spots, and to gain a deeper understand-
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ing of the CSDP. This may require organizational
changes in U.S. embassies in Europe, as well as U.S.
Missions to NATO and the EU—to better identify,
track, and decide whether and how to seek to influence the CSDP.252
Second, encourage European members to focus on
increasing their defense budgets. Moreover, emphasize the need for more efficient defense spending in
Europe through cooperation and pooling of assets.
Concretely, this could be undertaken by improving
the relationship between the NATO and the EDA.
Third, emphasize European responsibility for crises occurring on Europe’s periphery. This would encourage a sense of ownership of the crisis response and
help Europeans undertake the critical steps needed to
address existing capability shortfalls.
Fourth, seek to improve the relationship between
NATO and the EU. At the same time accept that Europe needs to have the necessary structures to act autonomously, including a limited permanent planning
capacity outside NATO.
Fifth, support the development of a common U.S.EU framework, including doctrine and training, for
stability operations. This would allow for increased,
but less ad-hoc, coordination between the United
States and the EU in the field, and encourage a sharing
of lessons learned.
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APPENDIX I
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
AMIS
African Mission in Sudan
AOI
Area Of Interest
AOO
Area Of Operation
AOR
Area of Responsibility
APOD
Airport of Disembarkation
APOE
Airport of Embarkation
AU
African Union
Bn
Battalion
C2
Command and Control
C3
Command, Control, Communication
CAR
Central African Republic
CAS
Close Air Support
CENTOPS
Centralized Operations
CEUMC 	Chairman of the European Union
Military Committee
CHOD
Chiefs of Defense
CIMIC
Civil Military Cooperation
CIS	Communications and Information
Systems
CJSOR 	Combined Joint Statement Of
Requirements
CMC
Crisis Management Concept
CMCO
Civil Military Coordination
CMPD
Crisis Management Planning Director
CoG
Centre of Gravity
CONOPS
Concept of Operations
CJSOTF 	Combined Joint Special Operations
Task-Force
CJSOCC 	Combined Joint Special Operations
Component Command
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CJSOCCE	Comined Joint Special Operations
Component Command Element
CS
Combat Support
CSDP
Common Security and Defense Policy
CSS
Combat Service Support
DECENTOPS Decentralized Operations
DGSSIE
State Security Service
DoD
Department of Defense
DPKO 	Department of Peace Keeping
Operations
EATC
European Air Transport Command
EC
European Commission
ECHO 	European Commission Humanitarian
Office
EDA
European Defense Agency
ESDP
European Security Defence Policy
EU
European Union
EUBG
European Union Battlegroups
EUFOR
European Force
EUMC
European Union Military Committee
EUMCC
EU Movement Co-ordination Centre
EUMS
European Union Military Staff
EU Ops Center European Union Operations Center
EUSC
EU Satellite Centre
EUSR 	European Union Special
Representative
FAS
Forces Armees et de Securite
FCdr
Force Commander
FCO
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FHQ
Force Headquarters
FOB
Forward Operating Base
FOC
Full Operational Capability
FoF
Follow-on Force
GAERC	General Affairs and External Relations
Council
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GoC
Government of Chad
GSC
General Secretariat of the Council
HNS
Host Nation Support
HO
Humanitarian Organization
HQ
Headquarters
HUMINT
Human Intelligence
ICC
International Criminal Court
IDP
Internally Displaced Person
IEF
Initial Entry Forces
IMD
Initiating Military Directive
IMINT
Imagery Intelligence
IO
International Organization
IOC
Initial Operational Capability
ISTAR 	Intelligence Surveillance Target
Acquisition Reconnaissance
JEM
Justice and Equality Movement
JFACC
Joint Force Air Component Command
LOC
Lines of Communications
MANPADS
Man Portable Air Defense Systems
MCCE 	Movement Co-ordination Centre
Europe
MEDEVAC
Medical Evacuation
Milreps
Military Representatives
MINURCAT Mission des Nations Unies en République
Centre Africaine et au Tchad (Mission
of the UN in the Central African
Republic and to Chad)
MNB
Multinational Base
MOD
Ministry of Defense
MPA
Maritime Patrol Aircraft
MSO
Military Strategic Options
MSOD
Military Strategic Option Directive
NAC
North Atlantic Council
NATO
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBG
Northern (Nordic) Battlegroup
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NCC
National Contingent Commanders
NEO
Noncombatant Evacuation Operation
NGO
Nongovernmental Organization
NIC
National Intelligence Cell
NILO
National Intelligence Liaison Officer
OHQ
Operation Headquarters
OpCdr
Operation Commander
OPCON
Operational Control
OPLAN
Operation Plan
POD
Port of Disembarkation
POE
Port of Embarkation
PSC
Political and Security Committee
PSOR
Provisional Statement of Requirement
QRF
Quick Reaction Force
RCA 	République Centre-Africaine (Central
African Republic)
ROE
Rules Of Engagement
SASE
Safe and Secure Environment
SG/HR 	Secretary General / High
Representative
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers
Europe
SIGINT
Signal Intelligence
SOF
Special Operations Forces
SOFA
Status of Forces Agreement
SOR
Statement of Requirement
SPOD
Seaport of Disembarkation
SR
Surveillance Reconnaissance
TCN
Troop Contributing Nation
TF
Task Force
ToA
Transfer of Authority
UAV
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
UK
United Kingdom
UN
United Nations
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UNAMID 	United Nations / African Union
Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNAMIS
UN mission of the Sudan
UNSC
United Nations Security Council
UNSCR 	United Nations Security Council
Resolution
UNSG
United Nations Secretary General
WEU
Western European Union
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APPENDIX II
CHRONOLOGY:
OPERATION EUFOR TCHAD/RCA1
May 2007
21 May 2007

France suggests an initiative for
Chad

Preparation Phase
July 2007
13 Jul 2007
23 Jul 2007

27 Jul 2007

Joint Council-Commission
Options Paper
General Affairs and External
Relations Council (GAERC) gives
planning authority to Council
Secretariat
PSC issues CMC tasker

September 2007
3 Sep 2007
10 Sep 2007

12 Sep 2007
24 Sep 2007

OHQ preactivation
PSC approves CMC and gives
planning authority to Mont
Valerien
OHQ Council approves CMC;
MSO paper is released
Indicative force generation
conference; draft mission analysis
brief reviewed
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25 Sep 2007

UN Security Council approves
Resolution 1778

October 2007
4 Oct 2007
15 Oct 2007

23 Oct 2007

MSO 3 adopted
Council issues Joint Action;
Operation Commander arrives in
OHQ
Initiating Military Directive
issued by EUMC

November 2007
8 Nov 2007
9 Nov 2007
12 Nov 2007

PSC adopts CONOPS
1st force generation conference
Council adopts CONOPS

January 2008
11 Jan 2008
14 Jan 2008
18 Jan 2008
28 Jan 2008

5th and last force generation
conference
Operation Commander presents
draft OPLAN
Revised OPLAN released
Council accepts OPLAN and
formally launches operation

Deployment Phase
31 Jan 2008
1-2 Feb 2008
3 Feb 2008

Chadian Rebels enter N’Djamena
Fighting in N’Djamena
Rebels retreat from N’Djamena
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6 Feb 2008
12 Feb 2008
19 Feb 2008
21 Feb 2008
3 Mar 2008

6 Mar 2008
15 Mar 2008

Status of Forces Agreement
(SOFA) with Cameroon signed
First flight into the Area of
Operation (Swedish C-130)
First operation by EUFOR Initial
Entry Forces in the AOO
First EUFOR convoy departs
N’Djamena for Abeche
First EUFOR casualty (KIA:
Adjudant Gilles Polin, 1er
Régiment de Parachutistes
d'Infanterie de Marine (1st
Marine Parachute Infantry
Regiment, RPIMa)
Status of Forces Agreement
(SOFA) with Chad signed
Initial Operating Capability
declared by Operation
Commander

Execution Phase
24 Mar 2008

16 Apr 2008
1 May 2008

Exchange of Letter between
EU Secretary General / High
Representative and UN Secretary
General on EUFOR-MINURCAT
cooperation
SOFA with Central African
Republic signed
Death of Pascal Marlinge
(Director Chad, Save the
Children) in AOO
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14 Jun 2008
17-24 Jun 2008

7-12 Jul 2008
17-18 Jul 2008
18 Aug 2008
15 Sep 2008
25 Sep 2008

4-7 Oct 2008
8 Nov 2008

8 Dec 2008
14 Jan 2009

Rebel attack on Goz Beida
EU-UN Joint Assessment Mission
to AOO to prepare mid-Mandate
Review
First of several Combined Joint
Operations in theater
Deployment of two Albanian
Platoons to Chad
Am Nabak incident
Full Operational Capability
(FOC) of assigned forces attained
UN Security Council adopts
Resolution 1834 (2008) which
expresses intention to authorize
the deployment of a UN military
component to follow-up on
EUFOR
Deployment of Croatian
personnel to Chad
Evacuation of nine NGO
personnel from Ouandja area in
CAR
Arrival of four Russian MI-8
helicopters in N’Djamena
UN Security Council adopts
Resolution 1861 (2009)
authorizing the deployment
of a military component of
MINURCAT to follow up EUFOR
with the transfer of authority on
March 15, 2009
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24 Jan 2009

27 Jan 2009

15 Mar 2009

7 Apr 2009

The first member of MINURCAT
Core Planning Team arrives in
Chad to commence establishment
of the MINURCAT FHQ
Technical Agreement between
the UN and EUFOR on the
Handover of the Operation is
signed
Transfer of Authority from
EUFOR TCHAD/RCA to
MINURCAT
Incident in Stars Camp
(Abéché) leading to the death
of two EUFOR soldiers, one
MINURCAT soldier and a
Chadian civilian

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX II
1. Based on various interviews and Alexander Mattelaer, The
Strategic Planning of EU Military Operations—The Case of EUFOR
Tchad/RCA, Working Paper, No. 5, Brussels, Belgium: Institute for
European Studies, 2008.
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APPENDIX III
OVERVIEW OF NATIONAL PARTICIPATION
AT FOC1
Country

OHQ

FHQ

Forces

Forces Total

Austria

4

13

156

173

Belgium

6

4

68

78

Bulgaria

1

1

0

2

Cyprus

2

0

0

2

Czech Republic

1

1

0

2

Germany

4

0

0

4

Greece

3

2

0

5

Finland

2

2

58

62

France

69

114

1775

1958

3

0

0

3

18

10

422

450

Italy

4

2

97

103

Lithuania

2

0

0

2

Luxembourg

0

2

0

2

Netherlands

3

5

66

74

Poland

4

5

409

418

Portugal

2

0

0

2

Romania

1

1

0

2

2

Sweden

4

5

1

10

Slovakia

1

0

0

1

Slovenia

1

1

24

26

Spain

3

3

81

87

United Kingdom

2

2

0

4

EU

1

0

0

1

Albania

0

0

63

63

Croatia

0

0

15

15

Russia

0

0

79

79

141

173

3314

3628

Hungary
Ireland

Total
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ENDNOTES - APPENDIX III
1. Patrick Nash, “EU Peacekeeping in Action: EUFOR Chad/
RCA,” Presentation, Institute for International and European Affairs (IIEA), Dublin, Ireland, September 10, 2009.
2. Sweden participated with 120 troops in the early phase of
the operation, but had largely withdrawn at FOC.
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